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ARTICLES
MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: WINDFALLS
FOR THE HEALTHY, WEALTHY & WISE
Regina T. Jefferson*
INTRODUCTION
As the average life expectancy lengthens,' ensuring that Americans set
aside sufficient dollars for their retired years has become an increasingly
important aspect of national economic policy and individual saving prac-
tices.2 Contemporary medical and technological advancements allow
* Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus
School of Law. I wish to thank Jennifer Winter and Benjamin Ogletree for their
very valuable research assistance on this project.
1. In 1990, roughly 31.2 million people in the United States were age sixty-five or
older. See JENNIFER CHEESEMAN DAY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, P25-1092,
POPULATION PROJECTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, BY AGE, SEX, RACE, AND
HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1992 TO 2050, at xiv tbl.G (1992) [hereinafter CENSUS: 1992-2050].
The elderly population is expected to increase dramatically in the twenty-first century as
the post-World War II baby-boom generation reaches retirement age. See Nina J. Crimm,
Tax Plans for the Twenty-First Century: Medical Incentive Vouchers Address the Needs of
Academic Health Centers and the Elderly, 71 TUL. L. REV. 653, 662 (1997) (noting that as
the post-World War II baby-boomers enter their "golden years" in the second decade of
the twenty-first century, elderly Americans will comprise a greater percentage of the over-
all population than ever before). In fact, the elderly population is projected to double by
the middle of the twenty-first century. See id. The average life expectancy of Americans
increased from forty-seven years to seventy-four years-a difference of twenty-seven
years-since the beginning of the twentieth century. See id. at 657. The Census Bureau
anticipates that the average life expectancy for females and males will be 82 years and
74.2, respectively, by the year 2020. See id. at 663 n.46.
2. Cf. Senator J. Robert Kerrey, Welfare Reform: Economic Security for the Next
Century, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 13, 14 (1998) (arguing that many contemporary in-
come-support programs are outdated and incapable of providing income security in the
modern era). Government-sponsored programs, including Medicare and Medicaid, ab-
sorb less than 60% of the health care expenditures attributable to the elderly. See Crimm,
supra note 1, at 660. For example, Medicare currently does not cover in-home and nursing
home health care costs. See id. at 660 n.30. As a result, such expenses must be paid out-
of-pocket, imposing a significant financial burden that depletes the retirement savings and
security of the growing elderly population. Cf. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
TRENDS IN HEALTH SPENDING: AN UPDATE 14 (1993) [hereinafter HEALTH SPENDING]
(reporting that the elderly allocated in excess of 10% of their income to health care ex-
Catholic University Law Review
people today to enjoy not only longer, but healthier, more fulfilling lives.
Thus, financial preparation for immediate and future health care ex-
penses also has emerged as a critical element of many individuals' per-
sonal savings goals. However, the rapidly rising cost of health care
makes it extremely difficult for most individuals to effectively accomplish
this goal.5
In 1996, Congress responded to growing national concern about the
cost and availability of health care by enacting the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA or "the Act"). 6  The
penses between 1984 and 1991). Consequently, the retirement savings of the baby-boomer
population may be insufficient to cover even anticipated post-retirement expenditures,
much less the inordinate expenses attributable to long-term catastrophic medical care. See
Crimm, supra note 1, at 661.
3. The increase in life expectancy among Americans is due in significant part to the
reduction in mortality rates which, in turn, is attributed to technological developments in
medicine. See Dorothy P. Rice & Jacob J. Feldman, Living Longer in the United States:
Demographic Changes and Health Needs of the Elderly, 61 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND
Q. 362, 367-71 (1983) (suggesting that the decline of mortality rates is attributed to devel-
opments in research and understanding of disease etiology, the use of innovative diagnos-
tic and surgical procedures, tempered lifestyles, etc.); see also Joann Babiak, Health-Care
Access for the Elderly of Industrialized Nations: Fallen and Can't Get Up?, 4 ILSA J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 221, 224-25 (1997) (explaining that because of improvements in living envi-
ronments, "individuals in industrialized countries are generally able to predict with cer-
tainty that they will attain old age"). Specifically, advances in preventative medicine and
healing techniques, reduced smoking, lower cholesterol levels, and stress management are
responsible for increasing adult life expectancy. See Crimm, supra note 1, at 664 & n.51
(citing the reduction in the overall occurrence of heart disease and strokes as major con-
tributors to increasing the longevity of Americans' lives). As a result, the 65 and older age
group has increased at nearly double the rate of growth of the younger populations. See
id. at 657. This trend is expected to accelerate significantly after the year 2000. See Ker-
rey, supra note 2, at 15.
4. The longer people live, the more likely they are to develop health problems, re-
quiring them to set aside enough money to pay for health care. See Crimm, supra note 1,
at 657-58 ("As more people live longer, chronic diseases emerge as major causes of death
and disability that may impair a person's ability to function and may require medical man-
agement."); see also John Gibeaut, Senior Advisers: What Every Lawyer with Older Clients
or Aging Parents Needs to Know About Protecting Their Health Care and Estates, A.B.A.
J., Apr. 1997, at 56 ("Americans are living longer, and as this elder population grows, so
do the medical, financial and legal problems that often accompany old age."); cf Kerrey,
supra note 2, at 14 (arguing that, because of the dramatic increase in the cost of medical
care, "families must have health insurance to cover their basic health needs or they risk
personal bankruptcy").
5. Cf. Milt Freudenheim, Survey Finds Health Costs Rose in '95, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30, 1996, at D1 (indicating that the increase in national health care costs has been outpac-
ing the overall growth of the national economy); Kerrey, supra note 2, at 14 (noting that,
adjusted for inflation, national health care expenditures rose from $134.6 billion in 1960 to
$949.4 billion in 1994).
6. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936. For the remainder of the article, I will refer to the statute as the HIPAA.
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HIPAA, a very popular piece of legislation, garnered bi-partisan sup-
port.' It also was received well by both business and consumer advocates
across the United States.8
The HIPAA was intended to improve the availability of affordable
health care in America by enhancing portability and continuity of health
care coverage, increasing long-term medical care service, and simplifying
the administration of the national health care system.9 In enacting the
HIPAA, Congress chose to add to an existing array of tax incentive pro-
grams, rather than adopt a new comprehensive governmental health care
system. Interestingly, contrary to its intent of making health care more
available to the general public, some provisions of the HIPAA actually
widened the gap between those who can afford adequate health care and
those who cannot. For this reason, some portions of the legislation were
seriously opposed.'0
The creation of the Medical Savings Account" (MSA) program was
one of the Act's most contested provisions. 2 The MSA is a savings pro-
gram for financing health care expenses that is designed to supplement
traditional indemnity and medical insurance programs. 3 Commonly re-
7. The United States House of Representatives passed the HIPAA with only two
dissenting votes on August 1, 1996. See 142 CONG. REC. H9785, H9795 (daily ed. Aug. 1,
1996) (House vote on HIPAA Conference Report); Judith Havemann, House Votes to
Protect Health Insurance Access, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1996, at Al. Likewise, the United
States Senate passed the Act unanimously on August 2, 1996. See 142 CONG. REC. S9501,
S9526 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (Senate vote on HIPAA Conference Report); Eric Schmitt,
Wages and Health Lead the Agenda as Congress Acts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3,1996, at Al.
8. Cf. Tamara E. Russell, Note, Trav'lin' Light: Early Retirees and the Availability of
Post-Retirement Health Benefits, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 537, 558 (1996) (arguing that Medi-
cal Savings Accounts (MSAs), created by the HIPAA, "satisfy the policy objectives of
fairness, flexibility, and stability by virtue of their structure"); Albert B. Crenshaw, Health
Care's Hot Seller: Medical Savings Accounts, WASH. POST, May 18, 1997, at HI (noting
that tax advantages established under the HIPAA "[make] MSAs big sellers with law
firms").
9. See HIPAA, 110 Stat. at 1936 (preamble); see also Craig M. Stephens, Recent
Development, The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act: Favorable Tax
Treatment for Medical Savings Accounts, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 457, 457 (1997) (ex-
plaining the Act's purpose).
10. See Havemann, supra note 7, at Al (discussing the argument in Congress that
"medical savings accounts would attract the healthy and wealthy and siphon off all but the
poor and sick from the overall insurance pool").
11. HIPAA § 301, 110 Stat. at 2037 (codified at I.R.C. § 220 (West Supp. 1998)).
12. Dispute over MSAs was the primary roadblock that delayed the passage of health
care reform. See Robert A. Rosenblatt, Insurers Set to Give Medical Savings Accounts Big
Push, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1996, at Dl; Eric Weissenstein, MSAs Still Hindering Reform
Bill Passage, MOD. HEALTHCARE, July 8, 1996, at 8.
13. See generally I.R.C. § 220.
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ferred to as a "medical IRA,' 4 the MSA is structured to allow partici-
pants to pay for current medical expenses and to encourage them to save
for future health care costs. 5 The MSA permits funds not used in the
current tax year for medical expenses to accumulate tax-free for use in
future years.16
The ability to carry over unused funds is the most controversial feature
of the MSA. 7 The carry-over feature effectively enables account holders
to use their MSAs as tax-preferred retirement savings vehicles. Unlike
traditional tax-preferred retirement savings programs, however, the use
of MSA funds is not limited to retirement savings purposes. 8 Instead,
MSA account holders are permitted to use their tax-preferred accumu-
lated savings without penalty for' either retirement savings or current
medical expenses.19
On its face, the MSA program appears to be an efficacious method of
tackling the overwhelming problems of long-term health care financing
and the increasing need for retirement income security by encouraging
individuals to take more responsibility for their health care choices and,
at the same time, by providing tax incentives to save for both current
14. Stephens, supra note 9, at 457.
15. See I.R.C. § 220(d)(1) (Supp. II 1996) (defining an MSA as "a trust created or or-
ganized in the United States exclusively for the purpose of paying the qualified medical
expenses of the account holder").
16. See id. § 220(e)(1).
17. See Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Signs Bill to Give Portability In Insurance, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 1996, at B12. Two of the most well publicized, but not the most contro-
versial, provisions of the HIPAA addressed portability and pre-existing conditions. See id.
Under the HIPAA, workers are permitted to maintain health insurance coverage if they
change or lose their jobs, and insurance companies are prohibited from denying coverage
to individuals who have preexisting medical conditions. See HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
§8 701, 702, 2701, 2702, 2741, 2742, 110 Stat. 1936, 1939-46, 1955-62, 1972-83 (1996) (codi-
fied at scattered sections of 29 & 42 U.S.C.); see also Purdum, supra. The Act also in-
cludes a provision which allows dying individuals, particularly AIDS patients, to draw on
their life insurance benefits while still living. See HIPAA § 331, 110 Stat. at 2067-69; see
also Purdum, supra.
18. See I.R.C. § 220(f)(4)(C) (providing that any distributions made after an account
holder reaches age 65 are not subject to the 15% excise penalty that typically applies to
distributions used for purposes other than qualified medical expenses); see also Benjamin
C. Ayers & Elizabeth Plummer, New MSA and Health Insurance Rules Create Opportuni-
ties, 58 TAX'N FOR AccT. 260, 263 (1997) (suggesting that Congress authorized, perhaps
unintentionally, the use of MSAs as an alternative means of securing retirement savings).
19. See Ayers & Plummer, supra note 18, at 260-61 (explaining that because MSAs
allow the taxpayer to accumulate unused funds, they closely resemble IRAs). With IRAs,
there is a 10% penalty for distributions taken prior to age sixty-five. See I.R.C. § 72(t)(1)
(West Supp. 1998). There is an exception to the penalty, however, if the distribution is
used for medical expenses or health insurance premiums, to the extent that they exceed
the 7.5% floor of I.R.C. § 213. See I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(B), (D).
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medical expenses and retirement savings purposes." However, the MSA
is a questionable response to these concerns because its underlying policy
runs counter to existing retirement income and health care goals.21
Moreover, the MSA program raises serious questions of fairness as it
benefits relatively few, failing to provide savings opportunities for a sig-
nificant portion of the population." As designed, the MSA dispropor-
tionately benefits the members of society who arguably least need assis-
tance with their health care expenses or retirement savings objectives.
Namely, MSAs benefit individuals with low health care expenses (the
healthy), individuals with high incomes (the wealthy), and individuals
who are knowledgeable about health service alternatives, their own
medical conditions, and the MSA program itself (the wise).
Parts I and II of this Article review the development, general structure,
and operation of the MSA program. Part III of this Article compares
and contrasts the MSA to other tax-preferred retirement savings plans
and explores the applicability of pension law to these arrangements. In
Parts IV, V, and VI, respectively, this Article demonstrates that the MSA
program disproportionately benefits the wealthiest, healthiest, and most
informed members of our society. Part VII of this Article examines the
impact of the MSA on the existing health care system. In Parts VIII and
IX, this Article identifies various deficiencies in the MSA model that
may undermine significantly its marketability as a viable health care
savings program. This Article ultimately concludes that the focus and de-
sign of the MSA program presents serious doubts concerning its ability
to accomplish its goals in the manner contemplated by Congress.
20. See Stephens, supra note 9, at 458 (rationalizing that "t]he utility of MSAs ap-
pears to encourage personal responsibility in the consumer before he spends a healthcare
dollar," by allowing individuals to accumulate unspent funds for future medical expenses
or retirement savings goals).
21. See discussion infra Parts IV, VII (arguing that MSAs do not provide savings
benefits to those who are not wealthy or have the highest health risks, and actually may
discourage physician consultation and preventive health care).
22. The availability of MSAs is limited in several important respects. First, MSAs are
available only to "eligible individuals"; that is, individuals who are covered under a high
deductible health plan, established and maintained by a small employer. See I.R.C. §
220(c)(1)(A). As defined, a small employer is an employer with an average of fifty or
fewer employees during the two preceding years. See id. § 220(c)(4)(A). Second, Con-
gress limited the available number of accounts subject to favorable tax treatment under
the pilot program to 750,000 in 1999. See id. § 220(j)(2). Therefore, even an expanded
program will benefit only those employees who can afford high deductibles and work for
small employers. Third, the tax and saving incentives provided by the MSA program dis-
proportionately benefit the healthiest and wealthiest population. See supra note 7; see also
discussion infra Parts IV and V.
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I. THE MSA PROGRAM DESIGN
The HIPAA was signed into law by President Clinton on August 21,
1996.23 This legislation amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(I.R.C. or "the Code") by adding § 220 which covers MSAs.z4 Under
§ 220, self-employed individuals and those employed by companies with
21fifty or fewer employees are allowed to establish MSAs.
The MSA combines a high-deductible, catastrophic medical insurance
plan with a tax-free, health care savings account.2' To qualify as an MSA
catastrophic health care plan, a plan's deductible must fall between $1500
and $2250 for individual coverage, 27 and between $3000 and $4500 for
28family coverage. To participate in the MSA program, an individual
must be enrolled in a qualified, catastrophic health care plan, and also
must establish a tax-free savings account. 29 Account holders are expected
to use their high-deductible plans to cover major medical expenses and
their tax-free savings accounts to cover ordinary, routine medical costs.30
The tax-free savings account also may be used to pay a portion of the in-
surance deductible. Once the deductible is met, the catastrophic plan
may be fully comprehensive or may contain further co-payments and re-
strictions.32
Unused funds contributed to an MSA in any given year are carried
23. See Remarks on Signing the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996, 1996 PUB. PAPERS 1319, 1320 (Aug. 21, 1996). President Clinton signed the bill
into law despite his concern that "much work remained to be done" regarding health care
in America. See Purdum, supra note 17, at B12. He was concerned about provisions that
would have expanded coverage for the unemployed and the mentally ill but were dropped
from the final version of the bill. See id.
24. See HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 301,110 Stat. 1936, 2037 (1996).
25. See I.R.C. § 220(c)(1)(A), (4)(A).
26. See H.R. REP. No. 104-496, pt. 1, at 109-12 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1865, 1910-13; see also Marilyn Hanzal, Medical Savings Accounts Set to Face Decisive
Test, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 20, 1996, at 5 (discussing the components of MSA ac-
counts).
27. See I.R.C. § 220(c)(2)(A)(i).
28. See id. § 220(c)(2)(A)(ii).
29. See id. § 220(a), (c)(1)(a).
30. See id. § 220(d)(2)(A). For purposes of the MSA, the definition of "qualified
medical expense" generally is consistent with the rules of section 213(d) of the Internal
Revenue Code for itemized deductions. See id.
31. See id. § 220(d)(1), (2)(A) (defining "qualified medical expense" as an amount
not covered by insurance); see also Mark V. Pauly & John C. Goodman, Using Tax Credits
for Health Insurance and Medical Savings Accounts, in THE PROBLEM THAT WON'T GO
AWAY: REFORMING U.S. HEALTH CARE FINANCING 274, 278 (Henry J. Aaron ed. 1996)
(stating that "[p]eople obviously could and should use the funds in their MSAs for their
deductibles").
32. See I.R.C. § 220(c)(2).
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forward to future years and can be used as a cushion against prospective• 133
health care expenditures. Alternatively, excess funds may be left in the
account and withdrawn without penalty for any purpose once an account
holder reaches her social security normal retirement age. 3' All distribu-
tions for non-medical purposes are classified as income and taxed ac-
cordingly." These distributions also are subject to a 15% penalty."
However, distributions made for non-medical reasons after an account
holder dies, becomes disabled,37 or attains the social security retirement
389
age are taxed, but are not subject to the 15% penalty.39
The MSA program is voluntary and tax-preferred. Congress pro-
vided substantial tax benefits in connection with the MSA program in the
hope that the incentives will prove sufficiently attractive to encourage
individuals to save in these arrangements.40 The MSA program provides
33. See Stephens, supra note 9, at 457.
34. See I.R.C. § 220(b)(7) (West Supp. 1998). Social Security retirement ages are as
follows:
Year of Birth of Individual Receiving Benefit Social Security Normal Retirement Age
1937 and before 65 years
1938 65 years, 2 months
1939 65 years, 4 months
1940 65 years, 6 months
1941 65 years, 8 months
1942 65 years, 10 months
1943-1954 66 years
1955 66 years, 2 months
1956 66 years, 4 months
1957 66 years, 6 months
1958 66 years, 8 months
1959 66 years, 10 months
1960 and later 67 years
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 416(1) (West Supp. 1998); CCH BUSINESS LAW EDITORS, SOCIAL
SECURITY ACT EXPLAINED 1 518, at 197-98 (1996) (listing retirement ages).
35. See I.R.C. § 220(f)(2).
36. See id. § 220(f)(4)(A); see also MICHAEL J. CANAN & WILLIAM D. MITCHELL,
EMPLOYEE FRINGE AND WELFARE BENEFIT PLANS § 10.2A, at 320 (1997) (explaining
the MSA distribution rules for non-medical purposes before an account holder reaches
age 65).
37. See I.R.C. § 220(f)(4)(B).
38. See id. § 220(f)(4)(C); see also supra note 34 (listing the applicable social security
retirement ages).
39. See id. § 220(f)(2); see also TAX ANALYSTS, A TAX LAW BAEDEKER: A GUIDE
TO THE 1996 TAX CHANGES 1 (David F. Windish ed., 1996) (explaining that
"[d]istributions [of MSA funds] after age 65, death, or disability are not penalized, but are
included in income").
40. See Stephens, supra note 9, at 458-59 (discussing the favorable tax treatment of
MSAs and observing that the Act includes both employer and employee-based tax incen-
1999]
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three tax benefits. First, within limits, personal contributions to an MSA
are deductible 4' and employer contributions are excludible from taxable
42income. Second, accumulated earnings in an MSA are not taxed until
distribution.43 Third, distributions for qualified medical expenses are tax-
free. 4
Upon the death of an MSA participant, if the beneficiary of the MSA
is the participant's surviving spouse, the spouse may continue the MSA
as her own. If the beneficiary is not the surviving spouse, the benefici-
ary must report the MSA balance as income in the year of the account
holder's death 6 If there is no beneficiary, the MSA balance is included
on the final income tax return of the account holder. 7
II. THE MSA CONTROVERSY
The MSA concept is a fundamentally different approach to providing
tives necessary to fuel the expansion of MSAs); see also Ayers & Plummer, supra note 18,
at 267 (concluding that the tax incentives provided in connection with the MSA program
"greatly surpass those of the medical expense itemized deduction"). Because MSA ac-
counts are tax exempt, see I.R.C. § 220(e)(1), estimates show that the MSA program will
cost the United States Treasury $3 billion in forgone revenue by the year 2006. See
Havemann, supra note 7, at Al.
41. See [R.C. § 220(a).
42. See id. § 106(a)-(b)(1). The HIPAA expanded the existing exclusions for em-
ployer contributions to accident and health plans to include MSA contributions as follows:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-Except as otherwise provided in this section, gross income
of an employee does not include employer-provided coverage under an accident
or health plan.
(b) Contributions to Medical Savings Accounts-
(1) IN GENERAL-In the case of an employee who is an eligible individual,
amounts contributed by such employee's employer to any medical savings ac-
count of such employee shall be treated as employer-provided coverage for
medical expenses under an accident or health plan ....
HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 301(c)(1), 110 Stat. 1936, 2048-49 (1996) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 106 (Supp. 111996)).
43. See I.R.C. § 220(e)(1) (providing that an MSA is tax exempt).
44. See id. § 220(f)(1); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-496, pt. 1, at 111-12, (1996), re-
printed in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865, 1911-13. Under the HIPAA, distributions from an
MSA for unreimbursed medical expenses of the account holder, an account holder's
spouse, or dependents, are not considered income. See id. at 111, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1912. The exclusion applies regardless of whether the payment is made
directly from the MSA to the service provider, from the MSA to reimburse the account
holder, or the account holder uses MSA funds to pay for medical services. See id.
45. See I.R.C. § 220(f)(8)(A) (providing that in the event a surviving spouse acquires
interest in an account holder's MSA, the "account shall be treated as if the [surviving]
spouse were the account holder").
46. See id. § 220(f)(8)(B)(i)(I)-(II).
47. See id.; cf H.R. REP. No. 104-496, pt. 1, at 112, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1913 (observing that "[i]n all cases, no estate tax applies").
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health care insurance.48  Unlike traditional health care protection, the
MSA program is designed to motivate participating individuals to take
more active roles in making decisions about their health care 
costs. 49
MSA proponents argue that, by giving consumers greater control over
their health care funds, in conjunction with an opportunity to save their
unspent health care dollars, the MSA model encourages consumers to
purchase health care services more prudently.0 These advocates antici-
pate that, as a result, the MSA program will curb the rising cost of medi-
cal care, making health services more affordable for all Americans in the
long-run."
Although evidence suggests that individuals are more conscientious
about expenditures involving the use of personal funds, the expected
benefits of the MSA program have been grossly exaggerated because
many indirect costs either have been overlooked or inadequately consid-
ered. 2 For example, proponents of the MSA fail to account fully for the
potential harm that the program presents for the conventional health
care system. 3 Proponents also have ignored completely the compliance
48. Cf. Ayers & Plummer, supra note 18, at 260 (noting that MSAs were intended to
furnish taxpayers with "a method to defray the cost of unreimbursed health care expenses,
while increasing competition for health care services"); Stephens, supra note 9, at 457 (ex-
plaining that MSAs were designed to control the increasing cost of medical care through
the use of tax-based savings). The MSA model is therefore premised on the notion that
once consumers have a personal financial stake in purchasing health care services, they
will spend the money more prudently. See id. at 458.
49. See H.R. REP. No.. 104-496, pt. 1, at 69, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1869.
50. See id. at 110, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1911 ("Because MSAs afford
people the opportunity to save unspent MSA funds for future health and long-term care
needs ... people will be more prudent in their purchase of health care services."); Ste-
phens, supra note 9, at 461 (acknowledging that supporters of the MSA program subscribe
to the theory that "personal responsibility will help to end careless spending of healthcare
dollars by putting responsibility for conserving funds back in the hands of the consumer-
the patient").
51. See H.R. REP. No. 104-496, pt. 1, at 69, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1869
(explaining that MSAs are designed to persuade plan participants to take a more cost-
effective approach to health care spending); see also Senator William V. Roth, Jr., Medical
Savings Accounts, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 149, 152 (1994) (commenting that
MSAs will help restrain rising health care costs by encouraging consumers to make more
careful health care decisions).
52. See John Burry, Jr., Monitoring Healthcare Dollars: Medical Savings Accounts: A
Quick Fix that Could Destroy the American Healthcare System (visited Sept. 30, 1996)
<http://www.citynet.net/msa.html> (reporting Congressional Budget Office skepticism
that MSAs will save money). This cite is no longer accessible, but is on file with The
Catholic University Law Review and the author.
53. See Medical Savings Accounts-A Bad Idea, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING REP.
(Winter 1996) (visited Sept. 30, 1996) <http://www.afscme.org/afscme/bargtabl/cbr4b.htm>
(contending that because MSA participants have no incentive to seek preventive care,
medical costs ultimately will escalate as diseases and illnesses will be more advanced and,
19991
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problems of having different distribution and contribution rules for tradi-
tional retirement savings plans than for MSAs.54 Additionally, MSA
proponents have not considered fully the additional administrative re-
quirements of implementing the program for which the cost ultimately
will be passed on to the health care consumers.55 Thus, when all relevant
factors are considered, the MSA program could actually increase the cost
of medical care services rather than decrease them.56 Even if all relevant
costs are considered and measured accurately, it is nevertheless ques-
tionable whether the expense of the program can be justified if MSAs
benefit only the wealthiest, healthiest, and most informed members of
society, without providing comparable benefits to those who are less for-
tunate.57
The rationale underlying health care reform in general, and MSAs in
particular, is that all citizens should have access to affordable health
care." Concerns that the MSA both jeopardizes the existing health care
program and disproportionately benefits the affluent were perceived by
many commentators as serious weaknesses.59 As a result, Congress in-
troduced the MSA as an experimental program to be offered on a limited
four-year trial basis. 0 After the trial period ends, Congress will deter-
mine if MSAs can co-exist with traditional health care plans and control
health care costs without benefiting only a few.
The experimental program provides for the establishment of a limited
number of MSAs6' and is scheduled to last until the year 2000.62 In 2000,
Congress will decide whether to abolish or expand the MSA program
thus, more costly to treat once detected and diagnosed). This cite is no longer accessible,
but is on file with The Catholic University Law Review and the author.
54. See infra text and accompanying notes 71-83, 102-04 (discussing the divergence
between MSAs and other employer-sponsored retirement arrangements).
55. See infra Part VII.C.2 (discussing the additional cost of implementation).
56. See infra Part VIII.B (discussing a similar program in Singapore which resulted in
an actual increase in medical care costs).
57. See Burry, supra note 52 (criticizing the MSA program as only benefiting healthy
and affluent people).
58. See 141 CONG. REC. H4541 (daily ed. May 3, 1995) (statement of Rep. Owens)
(noting that FDR's Economic Bill of Rights included the right to adequate medical care);
Crimm, supra note 1, at 661 (stating that "[aiccess to quality health care by and for an ag-
ing and elderly population is an important societal expectation").
59. See Havemann, supra note 7, at Al (reporting that many Democrats feared
MSAs would attract only healthy and wealthy participants to the exclusion and detriment
of persons who are poor and infirm).
60. See I.R.C. § 220(i)(2) (Supp. 111996).
61. See id. § 2200)(1)-(2) (Supp. 111996).
62. See id. § 220(i)(2) (Supp. 111996).
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based on the outcome of the experiment.63 To assess the desirability of
expanding the MSA program, Congress authorized two studies.64 The
first study, conducted by the Treasury Department, will evaluate the
level of participation in the MSA program and determine the effects of
the program on tax revenues s. 6  The General Accounting Office (GAO)
will undertake the second study.66 In connection with the second study,
the Comptroller General is required to retain the services of "an organi-
zation with expertise in health economics, health insurance markets, and
actuarial science to conduct a comprehensive study" to determine the
impact of the MSA on the health care market. 7
While the program's experimental status and reporting requirements
reduce its duration and heighten public awareness about its effects, these
characteristics do not eliminate the basis for concern about the MSA
program.68 The temporary quality neither justifies the program's dispa-
rate impact among taxpayers nor removes its threat to the existing health
care and retirement savings systems." More importantly, however, the
results from the studies of the pilot program could be misleading; they
may not adequately predict the effects of an expanded MSA program if
the composition and behavior of the experimental population is not rep-
resentative of those who would participate in a permanent program.
Therefore, to the extent that the MSA experiment is used to measure
63. See Ayers & Plummer, supra note 18, at 263; see also Medical Savings Accounts
Might Not Be Cure-all: Small-Business Program Has Supporters, Detractors, FLA. TODAY,
Sept. 8,1997, available in 1997 WL 14133358.
64. See HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 301(k)-(l), 110 Stat. 1936, 2052-53 (1996), re-
printed in I.R.C. § 220 notes (Supp. II. 1996).
65. See id. § 301(k), 110 Stat. at 2052, reprinted in I.R.C. § 220 notes (Supp. II 1996).
66. See id. § 301(l), 110 Stat. at 2052-53, reprinted in I.R.C. § 220 notes (Supp. II
1996).
67. See id. The study explicitly is required to determine the effects on the following:
(1) selection, including adverse selection, (2) health costs, including any impact
on premiums of individuals with comprehensive coverage, (3) use of preventive
care, (4) consumer choice, (5) the scope of coverage of high deductible plans
purchased in conjunction with such accounts, and (6) other relevant items. A re-
port on the results of the study conducted under this subsection shall be submit-
ted to the Congress no later than January 1, 1999.
Id. The first phase of this study was completed and submitted to the GAO on December
19, 1997. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS:
FINDINGS FROM INSURER SURVEY, GAO/HEHS-98-57 (Dec. 1997) [hereinafter GAO
MSA REPORT].
68. See Stephens, supra note 9, at 460-61 (predicting that the effect of preferential tax
treatment attendant with the MSA program will reach well beyond the confines of tax law,
implicating laws governing ERISA, Medicaid, Medicare and insurance).
69. See discussion infra Parts IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII (discussing disparate impact
and effect on health care and retirement savings systems).
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the feasibility of a permanent MSA program, the pilot must be evaluated
very critically. Not only is it necessary for Congress to assess the actual
experience of the pilot program, but also to anticipate effects beyond
those occurring during the relatively brief experimental phase.
III. THE MSA COMPARED TO OTHER RETIREMENT ARRANGEMENTS
A. The MSA/IRA Comparison
MSAs were promoted as health care plans.70 However, to the extent
that an account holder is able to accumulate unused medical funds and
withdraw them without penalty upon reaching retirement age, death, or
disability, the MSA program functions as a traditional tax-preferred, in-
dividual retirement arrangement, or IRA.71  In fact, because of their
similarity to IRAs, MSAs are referred to by some as "medical IRA[s].
71
However, the label "medical IRA" is misleading. This term suggests
that MSAs have a single, or at least a primary, medical savings purpose.
This conclusion is incorrect. MSAs can be used as effectively for retire-
ment savings purposes as for medical savings purposes.73 Thus, it is more
accurate to distinguish MSAs from traditional IRAs by emphasizing their
greater flexibility than by suggesting that they have relatively limited
74
use.
70. See H.R. REP. No. 104-496, pt. 1, at 110 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1865, 1911 (characterizing MSAs as alternatives to low-deductible health insurance that
are designed to encourage American consumers to be more cost-conscious in purchasing
medical services); see also Elizabeth Neus, Medical Savings Account Plan Isn't Getting
Many Buyers, Gannett News Serv., Aug. 30, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8835696 (charac-
terizing the MSA as a "new combination savings account/health plan designed as an op-
tion for those who don't like traditional health insurance plans").
71. See Albert B. Crenshaw, Without a Lot of Fanfare, A Lot of Tax Legislation,
WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1996, at H1 (describing MSAs as "IRA-like devices that allow
workers to save money untaxed to pay medical expenses if they have insurance that covers
only catastrophic illnesses"). Traditional individual retirement accounts (IRAs) provide
tax incentives for individuals to save for retirement. Eligible taxpayers may deduct up to
$2000 a year in contributions to an IRA. See I.R.C. § 219(b)(1) (1994). The earnings on
the IRA are tax-free, see id. § 408(e)(1), and amounts invested in an IRA are taxed when
distributed. See id. § 408(d)(1). The tax treatment of the traditional IRA is different than
the tax treatment of the new Roth IRA which is another type of IRA that receives prefer-
ential tax treatment. See infra note 84 (explaining the tax treatment of the new Roth
IRA).
72. Stephens, supra note 9, at 457.
73. See Crenshaw, supra note 8, at H1 (advising that if an individual can avoid mak-
ing large withdrawals from an MSA account, he may accumulate a "healthy nest egg").
74. See Ayers & Plummer, supra note 18, at 263 (reasoning that "because there are




The underlying purpose for the preferential tax treatment of employer
sponsored retirement savings, including IRAs, is to foster economic se-
curity in old age.75 To ensure that funds saved in IRAs and other tax-
preferred retirement savings plans actually are used for retirement pur-
poses, Congress places restrictions on the use of these funds." Addition-
ally, non-retirement uses of retirement funds generally are discouraged
by a 10% excise tax on the taxable portion of all early distributions, un-
less the distributions are made on account of death, disability, or the at-
tainment of age fifty-nine and one-half years.77
Therefore, the MSA's distribution rules substantially deviate from tra-
ditional pension policy to the extent that they allow unrestricted, pen-
alty-free distributions for health care expenses prior to retirement. 8 Re-
gardless of whether the use of retirement funds for health care expenses
is consistent or inconsistent with retirement income policy, pre-
retirement distributions result in fewer dollars available at retirement.
Thus, if individuals use MSAs as retirement instruments, their ability to
withdraw the funds prior to retirement ultimately could affect their re-
tirement income security.9
The following example illustrates numerically how the MSA can be
used as a more flexible retirement savings alternative than traditional re-
tirement savings arrangements. Consider a self-employed taxpayer with
$2000 of discretionary income. The taxpayer establishes an MSA cata-
strophic plan and deposits the $2000 in the associated savings account. If
this individual has no medical expenses in the first year, or chooses not to
use the savings account for such expenses, she will have $2000 plus the
75. See Gustave Simons, Qualifying a Plan: Tax and Legal Aspects of Pension Plan-
ning, in HANDBOOK FOR PENSION PLANNING 47, 49 (BNA ed., 1949) (stating that prefer-
ential tax treatment with regard to contributions to retirement savings illustrates a strong
congressional policy towards encouraging the establishment of pension reserves).
76. The requirements for qualified retirement plans are found in I.R.C. § 401(a).
Section 1.401-1(b)(1) of the Treasury Regulations explains that a pension plan qualified
under § 401(a) of the code is a plan established and maintained to provide primarily re-
tirement benefits, and profit sharing and stock bonus plans are arrangements that primar-
ily provide deferred compensation; accordingly, benefits such as death benefits and life
and health insurance must be incidental only. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1). Pension plans
may provide benefits for sickness, accident, hospitalization, and medical expenses subject
to the requirements of I.R.C. § 401(h). See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK,
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 151, 164 n.2 (2d ed. 1995).
77. See I.R.C. § 72(t)(1)-(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (1994).
78. See I.R.C. § 220(f)(1) (Supp. II 1996).
79. See Regina T. Jefferson, The American Dream Savings Account: Is It a Dream or
a Nightmare?, in TAXING AMERICA 253, 261 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows
eds., 1996) (discussing effects of early distributions on retirement savings).
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tax-free buildup available for distribution at retirement.' This result
would be the same if she had placed her $2000 in a traditional IRA. Un-
like in a traditional IRA, however, the taxpayer has penalty-free access
to MSA funds needed for medical expenses prior to retirement, without
first having to meet the 7.5% floor of I.R.C. § 213.1
Presumably, the MSA's flexible distribution rules are appealing espe-
cially to individuals with limited financial resources who may be reluctant
to save in traditional IRAs or employer sponsored retirement plans for
fear of losing access to their funds. For this reason, MSA savings may be
accomplished at the expense of traditional IRA savings or employer
sponsored elective contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans, in which dis-
tributions prior to retirement are more restricted.8 ' An argument could
be made that increased savings is desirable in any form and, therefore,
whether individuals save in MSAs or traditional retirement savings vehi-
cles is irrelevant. However, a shift from traditional retirement savings to
MSAs does not represent increased individual savings, but merely a
change in savings instruments and objectives.
Moreover, the ability to use retirement savings for non-retirement
purposes without restriction may have far reaching consequences. 3 If
medical and retirement savings goals are combined for purposes of the
MSA, it would seem that policymakers would be forced to consider com-
bining these goals for all other tax-preferred retirement savings vehicles.
A failure to consider such a combination would result in different distri-
bution rules for similar tax-preferred retirement savings vehicles. This
inconsistency introduces unnecessary complexity to the private pension
system. Taxpayers will find it more difficult to make informed decisions
regarding the available options for retirement savings, without the bene-
fit of extensive education and training. An average taxpayer with $2000
80. See Margaret 0. Kirk, Medical Accounts: Mixed Reviews, N.Y. TIMES, July 5,
1998, § 3, at 6 (explaining how taxpayers can opt to not use MSA funds for medical expen-
ditures).
81. See I.R.C. § 220(f)(1) (Supp. 11 1996). Traditional IRAs allow distributions for
medical expenses that are deductible under § 213 of the Code. See I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(B).
Thus, a taxpayer first must meet a floor of 7.5% of adjusted gross income, see I.R.C. §
213(a) (1994), before such amounts are available without penalty for distribution, see
I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(B) (Supp. II 1996).
82. See I.R.C. § 401(k) (West Supp. 1998). A 401(k) plan allows an employee to elect
to have a portion of their compensation contributed to a qualified retirement plan. See id.
§ 401(k)(2)(A); see also Jefferson, supra note 79, at 264 (discussing the adverse affects of
more flexible distribution rules on employer sponsored elective contribution plans).
83. See Stephen L. Ferraro, MSAs Offer Health Care Option for Small Business, CAP.
DIST. Bus. REV., Sept. 8, 1997, at 13B, available in 1997 WL 10936080 ("MSAs represent
a paradigm shift in today's health care equation.").
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to invest in retirement savings today is faced with such an array of
choices that making the best decision can prove quite challenging. She
must consider, for example, the varying contribution limits, distribution
rules, and tax treatment for traditional IRAs and Roth IRAs.8 Both of
these individual savings arrangements can be equally as effective for re-
tirement savings, but are governed by very different taxation and distri-
bution rules.85 Therefore, the introduction of the MSA impacts the ex-
isting retirement system to the extent that it introduces an additional tax-
preferred savings vehicle, with different rules and regulations, in which
86individuals may choose to save for retirement.
B. Pension Law and MSAs
The MSA retirement savings feature is inconsistent not only with ex-
isting pension policy, but also with existing pension law. The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)8' governs employer-
sponsored retirement plans& In order to receive preferential tax treat-
84. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788, established a
new type of IRA, referred to as the "Roth IRA," named after its principal sponsor, Sena-
tor William Roth (R-Md.). See id. sec. 302, § 408A, 111 Stat. at 825 (codified at I.R.C. §
408A) (West Supp. 1998)). The maximum amount that can be contributed to the Roth
IRA is $2000, the same as traditional IRAs. See I.R.C. § 408A(c)(2) (West Supp. 1998).
In the traditional IRA, contributions are deductible but withdrawals on retirement are
taxable. See I.R.C. §§ 219(a), 408(d) (1994). In the Roth IRA, however, contributions are
not deductible, but withdrawals on retirement are tax exempt. See I.R.C. § 408A(c)(1),
(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1998). A numerical demonstration can show that, when a tax-
payer's marginal tax rate remains constant, the traditional and Roth IRA provide identical
benefits. See STEPHEN B. COHEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A CONCEPTUAL
APPROACH 908 (1989 & 1998 Update at 29).
85. Compare e.g. I.R.C. § 219(a), and id. § 408(d), with id. § 408A(c)-(d).
86. See Linda Stern, Medical Savings Account Offers a Great Tax Deal, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Sept. 1, 1997, at 18, available in 1997 WL 11399316 (noting
that consumers who "are a little bit crafty about administering [an MSA] plan ... [may
enjoy] an additional tax-free pot of money to retire on").
87. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1994)).
88. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1994) (explaining the coverage of the Act). Section 1001
of the Act articulates the congressional intent under ERISA:
The Congress finds ... that the continued well-being and security of millions of
employees and their dependents are directly affected by [employee benefit
plans]; . . . it is therefore desirable in the interests of employees and their benefi-
ciaries,... that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable character
of such plans and their financial soundness.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of [ERISA] to protect ... the interests of
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries ....
Id. § 1001(a)-(b); see also Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 975-76 (5th Cir.
1991) ("Congress enacted ERISA ... to protect working men and women from abuses in
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ment, all retirement plans must comply fully with the applicable re-
quirements and standards of ERISA.
Because MSAs may be used effectively as retirement savings vehicles,
some portion of the revenue forgone in connection with the MSA pro-
gram finances retirement savings. Thus, the cost of the program's sav-
ings feature, specifically the tax-free buildup of excess contributions, is
justifiable only if that portion of the program comports with rules and
regulations for the existing retirement income program. 9 Accordingly,
the retirement savings feature of the MSA program should be evaluated
under ERISA to see if that portion of the program complies with appli-
cable pension law.
Interestingly, there has been little discussion about the applicability of
ERISA to MSAs. As a result, many important questions about the im-
pact of ERISA on the MSA program have been left unanswered. For
example, it is unclear whether, or to what extent, the fiduciary rules of
ERISA apply to MSAs.9° Specifically, it is uncertain whether the MSA is
an employer-funded arrangement that would satisfy the requirements of
an ERISA welfare benefit plan, thereby subjecting the employer to the
fiduciary duties provided under ERISA.9'
Under ERISA, an employee welfare benefit plan is defined as
any plan, fund, or program ... established or maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization, .... to the extent that
such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for
the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiar-
ies, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise,.. . medical,
surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability, [or] death... 92
the administration and investment of private retirement plans and employee welfare
plans.") (quoting Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1982) (internal
quotations omitted)); Kornman v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of La., 662 So. 2d 498, 501 (La.
Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that ERISA is designed principally to safeguard "workers par-
ticipating in employee benefit plans from misappropriation and misuse of funds paid into
the plan and other abuses by regulating the administration of the plans").
89. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS, 43-61 (1982)
(discussing the lost revenue or tax expenditure attributed to private pensions).
90. See Stephens, supra note 9, at 460; see also ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001(b), 1021-31,
1101-1114 (requiring reporting and disclosure and laying out fiduciary responsibilities).
91. See Stephens, supra note 9, at 460; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-14 (fiduciary re-
sponsibilities).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). An MSA is arguably an employee welfare benefit plan
within the meaning of ERISA because the MSA is "(1) a 'plan, fund, or program' (2) es-
tablished or maintained (3) by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both,
(4) for the purpose of providing medical, surgical, [etc.] ... benefits (5) to [plan] partici-
pants or their beneficiaries." Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1371 (11th Cir. 1982).
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Therefore, the MSA could be considered an employee health benefit
plan under ERISA 93 because the catastrophic health care feature can be
viewed as a medical program established by the employer for the pur-
pose of providing medical benefits to participants and their families. Al-
ternatively, the retirement component of the MSA to which the health
care plan is connected could be considered an employer-sponsored re-
tirement plan. 94 The retirement feature of the MSA is structured simi-
larly to the Simplified Employee Pension (SEP).9 Under a SEP ar-
rangement, the employer contributes to IRAs on behalf of covered
employees in the same manner that an employer contributes to em-
ployer-deposit MSAs on behalf of covered employees. 96 Thus, the carry-
over feature of the MSA functions as an employer-sponsored retirement
benefit plan, indistinguishable from the SEP. Therefore, the fiduciary
rules of Title I of ERISA should apply to MSAs under the theory that
the program is either a welfare benefit plan, an employer-sponsored re-
However, much of the uncertainty surrounding ERISA's potential applicability to MSAs
stems from the lack of judicial consensus as to the precise definition of an ERISA em-
ployee welfare benefit plan in the context of employer-sponsored insurance plans. Com-
pare Kidder v. H & B Marine, Inc., 932 F.2d 347, 353 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that an
employer's purchase of a policy, or of multiple policies, that insure a class of employees
offers "substantial evidence," standing alone, that an employee welfare benefit plan is es-
tablished), and Donovan, 688 F.2d at 1375 (holding an employer's purchase of a group
health insurance policy to provide its employees with health coverage is evidence of, but
not itself, a plan), with Kornman, 662 So. 2d at 502 (reasoning that relying solely upon
whether an employer contributes insurance premiums in determining whether ERISA ap-
plies to group health insurance policies disregards other critical factors with respect to the
degree of control an employer maintains over a plan), and Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828
P.2d 496, 502-03 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (holding that an employer's "bare contribution" of
insurance premiums in providing employee insurance coverage is insufficient to establish
the existence of an ERISA plan).
93. See Stephens, supra note 9, at 460 (warning that determining whether an em-
ployer-established MSA plan would constitute an employee benefit plan within the
meaning of ERISA is an important threshold consideration); see also Credit Managers
Ass'n v. Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 617, 625 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining
that although no single act, by itself, brings a plan under the ambit of ERISA, an employer
nonetheless can establish such a plan "rather easily").
94. ERISA defines a retirement plan as one that is "established or maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization" and that "(i) provides retirement income to
employees, or (ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the
termination of covered employment or beyond." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).
95. I.R.C. § 408(k) (1994 & Supp. 111996).
96. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 76, at 151. Essentially, the SEP is an IRA
which is funded by the employer. Special limitations similar to those for qualified plans
are imposed on SEPs. See id. The SEP has an advantage over the traditional IRA be-
cause it allows larger contributions. See id. Although IRAs and SEPs are afforded similar
preferential tax treatment to qualified plans, they are not qualified plans. See id. As such,
SEPs are governed by statutory provisions that are separate and distinct from those appli-
cable to qualified plans. See id.
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tirement plan, or both.
Title I applicability would render employers who sponsor the MSA,
and perhaps even insurance companies that sell the catastrophic insur-
ance policies, ERISA fiduciaries.97 As such, they would be subject to a
duty to oversee the investment of the MSA funds.98 In the event of a
breach, ERISA fiduciaries are personally liable to the plan for any re-
sulting losses.99 Failure to apply the fiduciary rules of Title I to MSAs
would seemingly frustrate ERISA's goal of providing greater protection
to participants in employer-sponsored employee benefit plans.
The non-discrimination standard of ERISA raises similar issues of in-
consistency regarding the retirement savings component of MSAs.1°° In
order to maintain their tax-preferred status, qualified employer-
sponsored retirement savings plans must comply with ERISA's complex
non-discrimination rules.01 These rules prohibit plans from favoring
highly compensated employees over non-highly compensated employees.
Although MSA legislation requires an employer establishing an em-
ployer-deposit MSA to make comparable contributions on behalf of all
participating employees, because the MSA is not labeled a "qualified"
retirement plan, ERISA's anti-discrimination standards do not apply. °2
97. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (defining ERISA fiduciary duties).
98. See id. § 1104(a).
99. See id. § 1109(a).
100. See I.R.C. § 410(b) (1994). The non-discrimination rules ensure that employers
do not, beyond levels of permitted disparity, provide greater benefits to highly compen-
sated employees than to non-highly compensated employees. See id.
101. See generally id. § 410.
102. I.R.C. § 410(b)(1) provides that as a condition of qualification, a plan must satisfy
one of the minimum coverage tests set forth in I.R.C. § 410(b) and the regulations there-
under. For elective contributions plans in which participants choose whether to have the
employer make contributions to the plan directly or in cash to the employee, referred to as
401(k) plans, there are additional non-discrimination requirements to ensure non-
discriminatory levels of participation by non-highly compensated employees. See I.R.C. §
401(k)(3)(A) (1994 & Supp. 111996). However, the non-discrimination requirements for
MSAs are different. In order for an MSA to be considered non-discriminatory, compara-
ble contributions must be made available to all employees. See I.R.C. § 4980E(a)-(d)
(West Supp. 1998). A failure to meet the requirements of § 4980E(a) results in the imposi-
tion of a tax equal to 35% of the aggregate amount contributed to the MSAs in a given tax
year. See id. § 4980E(b). The employer must make available comparable contributions to
the MSAs of all participating employees for each year of coverage. See id. § 4980E(d)(1).
The contributions may be the same dollar value or "the same percentage of the annual
deductible limit under the high deductible health plan covering the employees." Id. §
4980E(d)(2)(a). For example, assume an employer maintains two different high deducti-
ble plans. Under one plan, the deductible for single coverage is $1500 and $3000 for fam-
ily coverage. Under the second plan, the deductibles are $2,000 and $4,000 respectively.
Further assume that the employer's contribution to the MSAs of participating employees
of the first plan is $500 for singles and $750 for families. The amount contributed to the
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Accordingly, if an employer makes the MSA available on a non-
discriminatory basis, but only the highly compensated employees choose
to participate, the plan would not be considered discriminatory. 3 This
result is inconsistent with ERISA's treatment of other elective retire-
ment arrangements in which plans must be non-discriminatory in both
design and operation.l4
Finally, as discussed above, the distribution rules for MSAs are incon-
sistent with the distribution rules that govern other employer-sponsored
retirement arrangements."" Although individuals are discouraged by the
10% excise tax from taking early distributions from other retirement ar-
rangements (e.g., IRAs and 401(k) plans), they are actually encouraged
to do so from MSAs with the tax-free treatment of distributions for
medical expenditures.'°6
Different fiduciary standards, coverage requirements, and distribution
rules for MSAs result in disparate treatment among available retirement
arrangements. Not only do these inconsistencies introduce an unneces-
sary level of complexity to the pension system as discussed above, but
they also produce peculiar results. On the one hand, the burdensome
rules and regulations of ERISA are imposed on employers who choose
to offer qualified retirement arrangements to their employees in order to
ensure that plan participants receive sufficient protection. 07 On the
other hand, because MSAs are excepted from ERISA's rules and regula-
tions, employers are encouraged to offer them and individuals are in-
duced to participate in them, resulting in less protection to plan partici-
pants. Even if one concludes that the MSA's goal of encouraging
second'plan will be nondiscriminatory if the contribution is either $500 for singles and
$750 for family coverage, or $667 for singles and $1000 for family coverage. See CANAN &
MITCHELL, supra note 36, § 10.2A, at 323.
103. Some plans may allow employees to choose between employer contributions to
an MSA or to another health plan. See CANAN & MITCHELL, supra note 36, § 10.2A, at
323. Thus, if the non-highly compensated employees disproportionately elect not to re-
ceive contributions to MSAs, a plan potentially could have only highly compensated indi-
viduals participating. See id.
104. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 410(b)(1); see also id. § 401(k)(3)(A). Section 401(k) plans are
nondiscriminatory if an insufficient number of non-highly compensated employees elect to
participate, regardless of the availability of the benefit to non-highly compensated em-
ployees. See I.R.C. § 401(k)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1998). It should be noted that there are
safe harbor rules for satisfying the nondiscrimination test for elective contribution plans.
See id. § 401(k)(12).
105. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text (discussing the disparate distribu-
tion rules for MSAs versus other tax preferred retirement arrangements).
106. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (identifying the 10% excise tax on pre-
retirement distributions under I.R.C. § 72(t)).
107. See I.R.C. § 401(a).
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individuals to become more involved in their health care choices over-
rides the need for consistency between the MSA and other retirement
savings programs, it is nevertheless important to acknowledge and ex-
plain the differences and similarities in these arrangements. This discus-
sion must take place in order to maintain support for the existing retire-
ment programs, and to avoid unnecessary confusion about the rules
governing the different individual retirement savings vehicles.
C. A Comparison of MSAs and Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs)
Some commentators have maintained that MSAs are not a new con-
cept, but are simply a variation of existing § 125 plans, commonly known
as Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs).'08 Under current law, employees
may contribute pre-tax money to FSAs to pay for medical expenses not
covered by their health insurance. °9 FSA funds not used for medical ex-
penses during a given year are forfeited by the employee at the end of
the plan year. " ° Thus, because FSA funds may not be carried over, ac-
count holders have incentives to spend as much of their FSA funds as
possible before the end of the year. By contrast, excess MSA contribu-
tions may accumulate tax-free and may be withdrawn without penalty af-
ter death, disability, or when an account holder reaches retirement age."'
Thus, FSAs and MSAs are very different concepts. They are similar only
to the extent that both can be used for current medical expenses. Unlike
MSAs, however, FSAs have no carry-over feature and, therefore, cannot
be used effectively as long-term savings arrangements.
IV. MSAs DISPROPORTIONATELY BENEFIT THE WEALTHY
The MSA program was established as a means of furnishing savings
opportunities to all Americans."2 However, the program's savings fea-
ture, in connection with the self-employed MSA, benefits high-income
taxpayers disproportionately and provides little or no benefit to low-
income taxpayers. Consequently, as designed, the program is incapable
108. See generally I.R.C. § 125 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (permitting exclusions for bene-
fits provided in connection with employer "cafeteria plans" that otherwise would be in-
cluded in gross income).
109. See I.R.C. § 125(g)(2) (1994) (special rule for health benefits).
110. See AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES, MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS:
COST IMPLICATIONS AND DESIGN ISSUES 1 (1995) [hereinafter COST IMPLICATIONS AND
DESIGN ISSUES].
111. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text (discussing the tax treatment of un-
used MSA funds).
112. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing improving the availability of
affordable healthcare under the HIPAA).
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of delivering the intended benefits to many of its anticipated beneficiar-
ies.
A. The Impact of Greater Discretionary Income
One reason the MSA program disproportionately benefits highly com-
pensated individuals is because it effectively expands the IRA contribu-
tion limit. "3 Under current law, annual IRA contributions are limited to
$2000. ' 14 By saving $2000 in an MSA as well as $2000 in a traditional
IRA, however, a self-employed taxpayer can double the IRA limit.
Low and moderate-income taxpayers will derive significantly less
benefit from an increased contribution limitation than high-income tax-
payers, because households that contribute to IRAs tend to be wealthier
than households that do not."' Studies conducted by the Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities indicate that, prior to 1986, when taxpayers
at all income levels could contribute up to $2000 to an IRA and deduct
the contribution from their taxable income, 82% of all IRA deductions
were taken by individuals in the top one-third income bracket.' 16 Only
8% of households earning between $10,000 and $20,000 made IRA con-
tributions during the same period. "7 Presumably, the lower IRA partici-
pation rate among low-income individuals was attributed to low earn-
ings. 8 Thus, it appears that low-income Americans earn insufficient
wages to take advantage of the MSA program's expansion of the IRA
limit. " 9 The only beneficiaries of the increased IRA contribution limit
are individuals who already contribute the maximum amount to their
113. See supra note 71 (describing IRA contribution limits).
114. See I.R.C. § 219(b)(1) (1994). It should be noted that when contributions are
made to both a traditional IRA and a Roth IRA, there is a collective limit of $2000. See
I.R.C. § 408A(c)(2) (West Supp. 1998).
115. See JAMES R. STOREY, INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNT ISSUES AND
SAVINGS ACCOUNT PROPOSALS CRS-5 (Cong. Res. Serv. No. 1B89085, 1995).
116. See Iris J. Lav, Senate Leadership Tax Proposals: Mushrooming Tax Cuts for
High-Income Taxpayers Would Jeopardize Long-Term Budget Integrity paras. 15-18 (vis-
ited Jan. 23, 1999) <http://www.cbpp.org/taxrpt226.htm> (discussing IRA beneficiaries).
117. See JAMES R. STOREY, INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS (IRAs):
LEGISLATIVE ISSUES IN THE 105TH CONGRESS CRS-6 (Cong. Res. Serv. No. 96-20 EPW,
1998).
118. See Jefferson, supra note 79, at 267.
119. Cf id. (discussing a similar effect on low-income Americans in relation to "The
American Dream Savings Account"). This discussion pertains to MSAs established by
self-employed individuals. Although the disproportionate benefit to taxpayers with higher
marginal tax rates occurs with respect to all deductions and exclusions, the fact that the
MSA increases existing regressivity in the tax system is particularly troubling because it is
a program touted to be responsive to the health needs of all Americans. See supra note 9
and accompanying text (citing preamble to the HIPAA).
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IRAs. Consequently, the MSA program increases the disparity between
the tax subsidy received by individuals who currently can afford to save
and those who cannot.
B. The Effects of Higher Marginal Tax Rates
Another reason the MSA disproportionately benefits the wealthiest
members of society is because of the progressive tax rate structure; the
applicable tax rate increases as an individual earns more income. Thus,
the benefit of an exclusion depends on the marginal tax rate of the tax-
payer. 20 To illustrate, assume an employer makes a contribution of $500
on behalf of two workers, A and B, in 40% and 20% tax brackets, re-
spectively. If A and B were taxed on the $500 contribution, A would pay
a tax of $200, and B a tax of $100. However, because the contribution is
excluded from each taxpayer's gross income, neither pays any tax on the
$500 contribution. Accordingly, the exclusion for MSA contributions is
more valuable to A than it is to B. 2' Similarly, the tax-free buildup of
excess amounts in MSAs is more valuable to high-income taxpayers.
Employer-provided payments for health insurance premiums in con-
nection with traditional health care programs also generally are excluded
122from an employee's gross-income. This exclusion, like the MSA exclu-
sion, disproportionately benefits wealthy taxpayers not only because the
value of the exclusion increases as income rises, but also because upper-
income taxpayers typically work for organizations that provide the most
generous employer health care contributions. 123  Therefore, the MSA
does not create the inequities that exist in the current health care system
with respect to disparate treatment among taxpayers in different tax
brackets for employer-provided health benefits, but the MSA exacer-
bates the situation by allowing a tax-free buildup of unused funds in ad-
dition to an exclusion for employer-provided health benefits. This result
is troubling, especially because the MSA program is marketed as a medi-
cal savings program designed to make the health care system operate
more fairly and increase the availability of affordable health care to all
Americans.
120. See I.R.C. § 1 (West Supp. 1998) (listing the applicable tax rates).
121. That is, 40% of $500 equals $200 and 20% of $500 equals $100.
122. See I.R.C. § 106(a) (Supp. 11 1996). These expenses also are deductible by the
employer under I.R.C. § 162(a) (West Supp. 1998) as business expenses.




V. MSAs DISPROPORTIONATELY BENEFIT THE HEALTHY
Proponents of the MSA program maintain that catastrophic policies
are relatively inexpensive and cost considerably less than traditional low-
deductible plans.12 Accordingly, they argue, an employer-deposit MSA
theoretically could be funded by the difference in the cost of a high-
deductible plan and a low-deductible plan without increasing an em-
ployer's overall cost.
125
Skeptics argue, however, that the cost of high-deductible plans vary
and, in many instances, are more expensive than proponents suggest.
2
1
When premiums for high-deductible policies are not significantly less
than those for conventional plans, employers who maintain their contri-
bution levels have only small amounts available to fund employees' tax-
free savings accounts. As a result, in these situations neither the savings
account nor the high-deductible policy will cover many of the medical
expenses incurred by account holders."' Thus, although the primary goal
of the MSA program ultimately is to make health care more affordable,
in some instances participation in the MSA program may actually in-
crease the out-of-pocket medical expenses for certain individuals, mak-
129
ing it more difficult for them to obtain necessary medical services.
Individuals who spend less than the amounts contributed by employers
to their MSAs will experience gains. Therefore, for the vast majority of
124. See Chris Bjornson & Douglas K. Barney, Tax Planning for Small Businesses: A
Dozen Helpful Strategies, 43 NAT'L PUB. ACCT. 11, 18 (1998) ("High-deductible insurance
will cost the company less than more traditional low-deductible plans."); see also Jim Gal-
lagher, A Few Pioneers Find Health Care Less Taxing, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July
13, 1997, § E, at 1 (noting that high-deductible plan premiums are often half those of low-
deductible plans).
125. See Brad Carlson, MSAs: Participants See Benefits to Alternative Coverage,
IDAHO BUS. REV., Mar. 17, 1997, at 1A, available in LEXIS, News Library, BusDTL File
("Theoretically a high-deductible policy would leave the owner with more money to put
into the MSA .... ").
126. See Len M. Nichols, Who Will Jump Into the MSA Pond?, Bus. & HEALTH, Oct.
1996, at 47, 51 (arguing that the decrease in premiums charged to employers as a result of
their changing to catastrophic plans would pay for less than one-half of the increase in de-
ductibles).
127. See News Hour: Sick Days (PBS television broadcast, June 6, 1996), available at
Online NewsHour: Medical Savings Accounts (visited Oct. 27, 1998)
<http://www.pbs.org/search> (use search term "sick days") [hereinafter Sick Days] (state-
ment of Gail Shearer, Consumers Union); see also Bennett Roth, Medical Program Looks
Sickly: Congress Debating Savings Accounts, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Aug. 16, 1998, at 1D
(stating that "many people are afraid they won't have enough money in their accounts to
cover regular medical expenses").
128. See Sick Days, supra note 127 (statement of Gail Shearer, Consumers Union).
129. See Kirk, supra note 80, § 3, at 6.
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Americans, who spend approximately $960 annually on health care, a
yearly MSA contribution greater than $960 would produce a surplus.3
For this reason, employees with histories of little or no health care costs
are more likely to prefer employer-deposit MSAs, because they stand to
benefit from the carryover of unused contributions. '3
Although healthy individuals stand to gain in the short-run from the
ability to select medical benefits according to their own interests and risk
tolerance, this flexibility could lead to a massive self-selection process,
which eventually would segregate the health insurance market.'32 The
healthiest individuals will remove themselves from the larger insurance
pool for traditional insurance arrangements, leaving only older and
sicker individuals to be covered by these insurance arrangements. Ulti-
mately, this situation will result in prohibitively high insurance premiums
for the most vulnerable members of society, making it difficult for them
to obtain adequate insurance protection.'33
VI. MSAs DISPROPORTIONATELY BENEFIT THE MOST INFORMED
A. Shopping for the Best Price
MSA proponents argue that because MSA funds eventually may be
used for non-medical expenditures, the program provides incentives for
individuals to be more selective about the services they purchase than
they would be under conventional health care plans.3 4 Accordingly, they
contend, over time MSAs will reduce appreciably the cost of medical
135care.
130. See Burry, Jr., supra note 52.
131. See id.
132. See Michele Conklin, Insurance Innovation: Experiment Provides For Medical
Savings Accounts for Small Firms, Self-Employed, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Jan. 5, 1997, at B5
(arguing that healthy people who use MSAs as a savings vehicle will "split the insurance
pool and drive up costs for the sick").
133. See id.; see also Charles Ornstein, Few Choose Pilot Health Program: Critics Say
Medical Savings Accounts Favor the Wealthy, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 23, 1998, at
1D (citing the results of a 1996 Urban Institute study that premiums of traditional health
plans will rise by 335% if the healthy population removes itself).
134. See Gallagher, supra note 124, §E, at 1 (contending that by spending their own
money, and not that of the insurance company, individuals will "price-shop more" and
forego unnecessary medical care). Opponents, however, argue that this price-shopping
will result in a neglect of preventive care, such as annual checkups. See id.; see also Dan-
shera Cords, Comment, The Medical Savings Account Provision of the HIPAA: Is It Sound
Health and Tax Policy?, 21 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 1217, 1228 (1998) (arguing that this
neglect of preventive care could result in "a reduction in the general level of health of ac-
count holders").
135. See Gallagher, supra note 124, §E, at 1.
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The underlying assumptions of this "more selective" theory are that
individuals are able to compare the prices of different medical treat-
ments, are fully informed about their medical conditions, and are fully
aware of all of the available treatment options. It is unlikely, however,•• 136
that the average consumer satisfies all of these conditions. Most indi-
viduals are not qualified to perform cost-benefit analyses of appropriate
health care procedures. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding many
medical emergencies would not lend themselves to an economically
driven decision-making process for individuals who are not expert in the
field of medicine."' For example, it is unrealistic to expect the average
parent of a sick child to investigate the cost of a penicillin injection in or-
der to determine whether the benefits of such treatment justify the ex-
138pense.
The relatively few individuals who possess significant medical knowl-
edge may indeed benefit from an opportunity to shop for competitive
prices and treatment. It is important, however, to question the wisdom
of encouraging those individuals who lack medical expertise to make de-
cisions that would withhold recommended medical treatment from them-
selves or others in order to save for future medical emergencies, or re-
tirement savings goals. If the MSA program causes such individuals to
make unwise health decisions, the program could be counter-productive,
increasing future medical costs.'39 Although consumer education would
remedy this problem, an initiative to educate the entire population of
health care consumers would require considerable time, effort, and ex-
136. See David A. Hyman, Consumer Protection in a Managed Care World: Should
Consumers Call 911?, 43 VILL. L. REV. 409, 451 (1998) (arguing for more aggressive con-
sumer protection regulation in the United States health care market because consumers
are "weak, ignorant, poor and disorganized" and have a "limited ability to 'shop
around"'). Furthermore, by forcing individual consumers to shop for the best prices,
MSAs actually may delay the receipt of timely care to those individuals. See Russell, su-
pra note 8, at 560.
137. See COST IMPLICATIONS AND DESIGN ISSUES, supra note 110, at 3 ("Clearly, in
medical emergencies, shopping around for a lower-cost provider is rarely in the cards ...
."); see also Cords, supra note 134, at 1227 (noting the unlikely situation of an individual
who is en route to a hospital in an ambulance deciding which hospital she should go to
based on cost). Additionally, once at the hospital or the doctor's office, it is virtually cer-
tain that an individual consumer will not possess the bargaining power to receive a better
price. See id.; see also Medical Savings Accounts-A Bad Idea, supra note 53 (arguing that
under an MSA plan, "group-negotiated rates would not be possible").
138. See Burry, Jr., supra note 52.
139. See John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311,
381 (1997) (arguing also that "MSAs would not improve health expenditure efficiency be-
cause personal control of health expenditures is inconsistent with the structure of cost con-
tainment through managed care, where systemic utilization review channels spending
choices").
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pense.
B. Gaming the System
The MSA not only rewards those who have expertise in the health care
area, but also those who have advance notice about their medical condi-
tions and, therefore, are able to predict more accurately their medical
expenditures. Because MSA legislation limits the ability of insurance
providers to impose pre-existing condition clauses,4 ' employer-deposit
141MSAs allow certain individuals to "game" the system. In years in
which individuals anticipate higher medical expenses, such as those asso-
ciated with starting a family or undergoing elective surgery, it is advanta-
geous for them to elect conventional plan coverage. 14  In other years,
when such expenses are not expected, it is advantageous for them to
choose the catastrophic insurance protection under the MSA program.
By using this strategy, individuals able to predict or plan their medical
expenses can receive substantial windfalls.143
Under the current health care system, an individual could utilize a
similar strategy. By opting-out of conventional coverage and making
contributions to an FSA in years in which the individual anticipates
140. See HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 1939-40 § 101(a) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 1181 (Supp. 111996)) (limiting the amount of time of any such exclusion to twelve
months for individual participants who enroll in the plan in a timely manner). The
HIPAA amended § 701 of ERISA in an effort to eliminate "job lock." See Cords, supra
note 134, at 1248. Job lock occurs when an individual with preexisting conditions in un-
able to obtain new health insurance, and therefore is restricted from changing jobs. See id.
at 1248 n.197.
141. See Medical Savings Accounts-A Bad Idea, supra note 53.
142. See id.; see also Elliot K. Wicks & Jack A. Meyer, The Role of Medical Savings
Accounts in Health System Reform (May 1998) <http://www.nchc.org/emerge/medicare2-
0698.html> (arguing that "[o]ver time, switchers in the aggregate may pay substantially
less than their full share of the care they receive..."). This "bunching" of medical ex-
penses in a given year to reap tax benefits already occurs with respect to deducting medi-
cal expenses under § 213 of the I.R.C. See Liz Pulliam, Be Stingy With Uncle Sam: A Few
Adjustments Now to Your Tax Status or Retirement Plans Can Lop Hundreds, If Not
Thousands, of Dollars Off Your '98 Bill, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1998, at D1 (advocating
"scheduling medical exams and elective procedures before Dec[ember] 31 if your medical
expenses for the year are already close to the deductible threshold, which is 7.5% of your
adjusted gross income"). By planning to undergo certain procedures all in a given year,
rather than across several years, an individual could deduct amounts from their taxes that
they may not otherwise have been able to deduct. See id. For wealthier individuals, how-
ever, this serves as a "generous subsid[y]" for elective procedures such as plastic surgery.
See COHEN, supra note 84, at 145 (quoting a 1980 Congressional Budget Office Study on
medical care).
143. See Wicks & Meyer, supra note 142.
[Vol. 48:685
Medical Savings Accounts
lower medical expenses,'" a taxpayer could both save annual premium
costs and reduce their out-of-pocket costs for expected medical expenses
by paying with pre-tax dollars. However, there is less incentive to use
this strategy with FSAs because, as discussed above, there is no possibil-





Finally, because the number of MSAs is limited and the program is
temporary, individuals who know to act prior to the effective dates of the
interim limits, or the program cut-off date, to establish their accounts
could benefit at the expense of individuals who are unaware of the pro-
gram, or fail to fully comprehend the complexity of the MSA pilot. MSA
legislation allows no more than 750,000 accounts to be established duringthe xpermentl " 146
the experimental phase. These accounts are awarded on a first-come,
first-served basis. Additionally, there are interim limits that establish
various "cut-off-dates" by which employees or self-employed individuals
must set up their MSAs in order to qualify for the program. Once an
interim limit is met, no new accounts will be granted tax-exempt status,• • 148
although contributions may continue to be made to existing accounts.
144. See Pulliam, supra note 142, at D1 (explaining that with flexible spending ac-
counts, "you can save hundreds of dollars if you plan right"). It should be noted, however,
that in certain circumstances, benefits under an FSA are considered "excepted benefits"
and therefore not subject to the requirements of section 701 of ERISA. See Application
of HIPAA Group Market Portability Rules to Health Flexible Spending Arrangements,
62 Fed. Reg. 67,688, 67,688 (1997).
145. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (explaining that FSA account holders
are subject to a "use it or lose it" requirement that bars carrying-over unspent dollars to
the next fiscal year); cf Carrie J. Gavora & Robert E. Moffit, Health Care: Improving
Consumer Choice and Access, in ISSUES '98: THE CANDIDATE'S BRIEFING BOOK ch.10
(1998), available at <http://www.heritage.org/issues/chaplO.html> (FSA and MSA sec-
tion) (arguing that the "use it or lose it" feature encourages families to spend for medical
services that may be "only marginally desirable or beneficial" just so they spend all that is
in their FSA account).
146. See I.R.C. § 220(j) (Supp. 111996). Uninsured individuals who establish an MSA
will not be counted in this number. See id. § 2200)(3).
147. See id. § 220(i)(3)(C); see also BETH C. FUCHS ET AL., THE HEALTH INSURANCE
PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPAA) OF 1996: GUIDANCE ON
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS CRS-24 n.36 (Cong. Res. Serv. No. 96-805 EPW, 1998)
(describing and explaining the provision's schedule of "cut off dates").
148. See FUCHS ET AL., supra note 147, at CRS-24. Because of uncertainty about the
effects of the interim limits in particular, and the design of the MSA pilot program in gen-
eral, Congress recently attempted to amend the HIPAA legislation. See infra note 197
(discussing the "Patient Protection" legislation passed by the House that would have ex-
panded significantly the MSA program).
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Thus, the MSA's structure and complexity potentially pit the unaware
against the more aware. If interim limits are reached, self-employed in-
dividuals such as lawyers, doctors, and investment bankers,' who have
access to financial advisors and planners, could prohibit the employees of
smaller, non-professional businesses from ever establishing MSAs. Al-
though the low levels of participation in the MSA program do not sug-
gest that it is likely the interim limits actually will prevent individuals
who desire to participate in the program from doing so, the mere possi-
bility of rewarding the most informed population at the expense of the
least informed is nevertheless a problem of perception."50
VII. MSAS AND THE EXISTING HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
A. Health Care Policy
The MSA is designed to encourage cost-effective consumer behavior
by increasing individual control over health care spending.' Under the
traditional health care model, patients rely heavily on their physicians'
advice and recommendations regarding their health care treatment.' As
designed, however, the MSA program places the onus on patients to
make these decisions more independently. Thus, the MSA program rep-
resents a paradigm shift away from existing health care policy.' This
149. MSAs presently are relatively popular among the self-employed. See Crenshaw,
supra note 8, at H1 (noting that MSAs have been "big sellers" with law firms because of
the tax benefits). For the self-employed, medical expenses under traditional health plans
only could be deducted to the extent that they exceeded 7.5% of the individual's adjusted
gross income. See id. With MSAs, however, all qualified medical expenses not covered by
insurance are fully deductible to the extent that contributions to MSAs are fully deducti-
ble. See id.
150. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text (explaining the participation cut-
off dates).
151. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (explaining that MSAs were de-
signed to increase individual control over medical spending, which in turn would encour-
age more prudent spending).
152. See ERIN DOMINIQUE WILLIAMS & LEO VAN DER REIS, HEALTH CARE AT THE
ABYSS: MANAGED CARE VS. THE GOALS OF MEDICINE 169-70 (1997) (describing the
traditional relationship between a physician and a patient as a "type of contract" in which
both parties freely share information"); cf. John G. Day, Managed Care and the Medical
Profession: Old Issues and Old Tensions, The Building Blocks of Tomorrow's Health Care
Delivery and Financing System, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1996) (explaining that "[u]nder
the traditional system ... [t]he decision of which doctor to go to, how much care one re-
ceives and the amount charged for each service is between the patient and the doctor").
153. See Ferraro, supra note 83; see also Peter M. Clarke, M.D., Correspondence,
Medical Savings Accounts, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1158 (1994) (noting that placing the
burden on patients to make their own decisions regarding health care will have "obvious
consequences" of separating wealthy and poor patients).
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shift not only alters the doctor-patient relationship, but also may have se-
rious consequences on the delivery of medical treatment.
MSAs may cause some individuals to shun routine medical check-ups
and other early-detection procedures to save money. 54 Financially
strapped consumers will forgo the aspects of their medical care that they
perceive as not urgently necessary; they will seek treatment only when
their medical conditions become symptomatic or severe. However, ill-
nesses that go undetected before they reach more advanced stages are
both more difficult and expensive to treat. Therefore, the MSA program
may undermine recent achievements in health care policy that emphasize
the importance of prevention, health maintenance, and early detection.
Those who defer early detection and preventive procedures in order to
save money are likely to be less wealthy.' As a consequence, poorer in-
dividuals will suffer from certain diseases disproportionately, while
wealthier individuals will continue to enjoy a full range of state-of-the-art
medical services."' This result ultimately may increase the cost of medi-
cal treatment of some illnesses57 and cause the health care system to be
158even more multi-tiered than it is today.
B. MSAs and the Rising Cost of Health Insurance Premiums
Most individuals who are covered under group and conventional
health plans pay premiums in excess of the medical expenses that they
incur.59 This enables these plans to cover the cost of the relatively few
154. See supra note 136 (stating that the price-shopping caused by MSAs will cause
individuals to neglect preventive care).
155. See Committee on Child Health Fin., American Acad. Of Pediatrics, Principles of
Child Health Care Financing, 102 PEDIATRICS 994, 995 (1998) (arguing that MSAs "in-
clude economic disincentives for preventive care and favor higher income groups finan-
cially").
156. See Clarke, supra note 153, at 1158.
157. See Medical Savings Accounts-A Bad Idea, supra note 53 (noting that "[w]ithout
preventive care, medical costs will eventually increase, since diseases and illnesses will be
more advanced and, therefore, more costly to treat once detected").
158. See Clarke, supra note 153, at 1158 (arguing that high-income patients will receive
outstanding care while low-income patients' health will suffer because they neglect dis-
eases to save money).
159. See Medical Savings Accounts-A Bad Idea, supra note 53; see also Bryan Ford,
Essay, The Uncertain Case for Market Pricing of Health Insurance, 74 B.U. L. REV. 109,
121 (1994) (noting that health insurers using the "community rating" system typically
charge all of their customers a premium equal to what they anticipate will be the average
health expenses of the group). It is estimated that "85% of Americans spend less than
$3,000 a year on medical care, and 73% have less than $500 a year in claims." Consumer-
First Health Care, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1994, at A14.
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• • • 160individuals who experience costly illnesses or injuries. Thus, the excess
premiums paid by healthy participants are necessary to offset the cost of
covering those who are sick. Studies show that even a modest self-
selection process causes premiums for traditional and managed care
plans to rise significantly; if as little as one-fourth of all insured individu-
als in traditional policy groups chose MSAs, premiums would rise by
two-thirds. 161Therefore, the removal of healthy individuals fromnearly  h  s     r , 1e 6f1e  h n i  d a s  o
the insurance pool eventually would drive up medical care costs for those
who are unable to profit from their own health, and ultimately jeopardize
the existence of conventional health insurance.162
Although the self-selection process can benefit healthier individuals,
even these individuals may be winners only in the short-run. As healthy
individuals grow older and experience deteriorating health, they too will
want to rely on conventional insurance for financial protection against
increasing medical costs. 63 By that time, however, the cost of traditional,
comprehensive health plans may be unaffordable. Consequently, the ini-
tial savings that a healthy individual enjoys by choosing an MSA today
could be depleted by the cost of a single medical emergency later in life,
when that individual's income is likely to be fixed. Therefore, both the
healthy and unhealthy should be concerned that the MSA program
threatens the viability of conventional health insurance.16
4
C. MSAs and the Risk of Rising Health Care Costs
The MSA's failure to deliver affordable health care to all Americans,
and its potential threat to the health care system does not necessarily
render the MSA program void of value or its cost unjustifiable if the pro-
gram is successful in curbing the rising costs of health care. However,
this result is unlikely. Although supporters of MSAs believe that the
160. See Linda J. Blumberg & Len M. Nichols, Health Insurance Market Reforms:
What They Can and Cannot Do (visited Jan. 18, 1999) <http://www.urban.org/
pubs/hinsure/insure.htm> (stating that "[t]he principle behind insurance is to spread indi-
vidual risks across a group").
161. See Len M. Nichols et al., Tax-Preferred Medical Savings Accounts and Cata-
strophic Health Insurance Plans: A Numerical Analysis of Winners and Losers, pt. III,
question 3 (visited Jan. 18, 1996) <http://www.urban.org/pubs/hinsure/winlose.htm>.
162. See Blumberg & Nichols, supra note 160 (arguing that "insurance dropping" by
low-risk individuals could lead to high prices, for which high-risk individuals do not have
the ability to pay).
163. See Medical Savings Accounts-A Bad Idea, supra note 53 (explaining that
healthy individuals will need comprehensive health insurance as they age).
164. See Ornstein, supra note 133, at 1D (quoting Gail Shearer, Director of Health
Policy Analysis for Consumers Union: "'Widespread MSAs will lead to premium spirals
that could drive traditional policies out of the market.').
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ability to accumulate unused account funds ultimately will reduce the
cost of medical care,65 studies have shown the MSA program will not
have a significant impact on the costs of medical services. 166 Moreover,
for the reasons set forth below, it is very likely that the cost of medical
care will increase rather than decrease as a result of the MSA program.
1. Medical Health Dollars Spent on a Few
First, the MSA program targets the wrong population and the wrong
medical expenditures to effectively reduce the cost of health care. The
distribution of health care costs in this country is highly skewed.'67 Ap-
proximately 70% of Americans account for only 15% of national medical
expenditures.'6 Nearly seventy-five cents of every dollar spent on health• . 169
care in the United States is attributed to only 10% of the population,
and at least 80% of all health care expenditures are accounted for by in-
dividuals who spend more than $2000 annually. Consequently, a more
effective way of decreasing medical care costs is to encourage the 10% of
the population that spends the most to cut back on unnecessary or waste-
ful services. 7' Additionally, medical expenses that typically exceed $2000
should be the focus of any initiative for reduced medical care spending.
165. See Roth, Jr., supra note 51, at 152 (arguing that the patient choice aspect of
MSAs will help to control health care costs); JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L.
MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER: THE FREE-ENTERPRISE ALTERNATIVE TO CLINTON'S
HEALTH PLAN 93 (1994) (contending that by allowing individuals to substitute less expen-
sive self-insurance for more expensive third-party insurance for small medical bills, the
result will be a lowering in general of the cost of health insurance). Additionally, propo-
nents argue that the cost of health care coverage would be lowered because expensive
third party insurance would be used only for catastrophic events. See id.
166. See Emmett B. Keeler et al., Can Medical Savings Accounts for the Nonelderly
Reduce Health Care Costs?, 275 JAMA 1666, 1671 (1996) (concluding in an economic
policy evaluation based on the RAND Health Expenditures Simulation Model that "[o]ur
simulations show that the MSA approach is not likely to produce the reduction in health
care use that its advocates foresee").
167. See Blumberg & Nichols, supra note 160 (stating in the discussion of the current
health insurance market that "[t]he most expensive 1 percent of our population accounts
for 30 percent of all health spending"); see also Marilyn Moon et al., Medical Savings Ac-
counts: A Policy Analysis, pt. III (visited Jan. 18, 1999) <http://www.urban.org/pubs/
hinsure/msa.htm> (cautioning that the skewed distribution of health care spending must
be considered in determining the potential for MSAs to reduce health costs).
168. See Burry, Jr., supra note 52 ("No Going 'Back to the Future"' section).
169. See id.
170. See Moon et al., supra note 167, at pt. III (arguing that, because typical cata-
strophic policies under an MSA have a $2000 deductible, "a majority of spending would be
protected by insurance and hence not directly subject to the incentives established by the
MSA/catastrophic [program]").
171. See Burry, Jr., supra note 52 ("No Going 'Back to the Future"' section).
172. See Wicks & Meyer, supra note 142 (arguing in the "Concerns of the Critics" sec-
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The MSA model adopts neither of these approaches. Instead, the pro-
gram targets the healthiest, wealthiest, and most informed members of
society, rather than the most wasteful consumers and the most costly
medical procedures.'73 Aside from the out-of-pocket deductibles, which
arguably will not affect a large percentage of spending, the MSA fails to
provide any other incentives to reduce medical care spending.'74
Furthermore, technological advances are the major reason that health
care costs continue to escalate. Many of these procedures are used in
connection with inpatient settings, where costs typically exceed the MSA
deductibles. 176 Accordingly, for these services, there would be no out-of-
pocket cost once an account holder met the plan deductible.177
It is even more unlikely that the MSA will affect the demand for high-
priced medical procedures by seriously ill individuals once their plan de-
ductibles are met.178 Facing dire circumstances, seriously ill individuals
who are insulated from the full cost of medical care are particularly un-
likely to make decisions about medical treatment that a rational person
incurring the full cost of medical care might make.179 For example, an in-
dividual suffering from a life threatening disease may choose an ex-
tremely expensive procedure, notwithstanding a very small probability
tion, that "various kinds of care management practices and rules may still be necessary" to
implement and to reduce costs of the expensive medical procedures that account for 84%
of the nation's medical care expenditures).
173. See discussion supra Parts IV, V, VI (explaining that MSAs will disproportion-
ately benefit healthy, wealthy, and highly informed members of the population).
174. See Moon et al., supra note 167, at pt. III.
175. See Crimm, supra note 1, at 663-64 (explaining that "[i]ncreased adult life expec-
tancy has resulted in large part from preventative and curative medical technology"); Gina
Kolata, New Era of Robust Elderly Belies the Fears of Scientists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,
1996, at Al (indicating that the mortality rate from chronic diseases plummeted 46.9%
between 1960 and 1990).
176. See Moon et al., supra note 167, at pt. III (noting also that high spending associ-
ated with inpatient services is "generally less responsive to price effects than more discre-
tionary outpatient services").
177. See id. at pt. III. It should be noted, however, that an individual still may have an
out-of-pocket expense equal to the amount of any co-payment that is associated with the
catastrophic insurance policy. See Crenshaw, supra note 8, at H1 (explaining that a quali-
fying policy may require co-payments, although total annual out-of-pocket expenses, in-
cluding the deductible, must be limited to $3000 for an individual and $5500 for a family).
178. See David Rind, M.D., Correspondence, Medical Savings Accounts, 331 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1158 (1994) (contending that the "rate of increase in the cost of medical
care for the seriously ill [will] not be substantially reduced" with the advent of MSAs);
Moon et al., supra note 167, at pt. III (arguing that "high priced procedures and tech-
niques may actually face less market discipline if we move to an open-ended fee-for-
service policy that fully protects families above the deductible as compared with pressures
on technology in a managed care context").
179. See Rind, supra note 178, at 1158.
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for success.1" Consequently, the widespread use of MSAs will have little
impact on the most expensive types of medical treatment. They will also
have little impact on the behavior of the relatively few individuals who
disproportionately incur medical costs that exceed the MSA deducti-
ble."' Thus, the MSA program is unlikely to succeed in reducing healthcare costs.
2. MSAs and Increased Administrative Costs
Second, the MSA debate rarely includes any discussion about addi-
tional collection and administrative costs. There will be, however, addi-
tional costs associated with the processing of small service invoices for
individual patients.182 If the MSA program is expanded, hospital outpa-
tient departments, clinics, and other health care providers will find it
necessary to restructure their billing procedures to bill patients individu-
ally, rather than collectively through insurance companies, as many of
the automated systems currently are equipped to do. Without the bene-
fit of electronic billing, service providers will incur increased costs for
hiring more processors to handle the additional workload."' Further-
more, under an expanded MSA program, service providers would incur
higher default and collection costs associated with individualized billing
processes.8 Amounts expended for these indirect costs ultimately will
be reflected in the cost of medical care, and may well offset any reduc-
181tion in expenditures that the MSA otherwise may generate.
180. See id.
181. See Wicks & Meyer, supra note 142 (arguing, in the "Concerns of the Critics" sec-
tion, that the large majority of medical expenses are above the MSA plan deductible and,
therefore, do not provide any incentive for cost-containment).
182. See Jeanne Schulte Scott, MSAs: Defining Terms and Setting Boundaries,
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Sept. 1996, at 26, 28 (arguing that billing to individuals will
raise administrative costs). Proponents, however, argue that MSAs will reduce adminis-
trative expenses associated with traditional health insurance plans. See AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES, ISSUE BRIEF: MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS 3 (May 1995)
(arguing that administrative savings would result from MSAs because there would be
fewer claims to process); American College of Physicians, Position Paper, Medical Savings
Accounts, 125 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 333, 337 (1996) (same).
183. See Scott, supra note 182, at 28. Additional administrative expenses also may be
experienced by the IRS in monitoring MSA withdrawals. See Medical Savings Accounts
Come Out of the Wilderness, HEALTH LEGIS. & REG., Jan. 25, 1995, at para. 21, available
in 1995 WL 8354903 (arguing also that individual account holders would be burdened with
record keeping). Furthermore, providers still would have to provide verification of medi-
cal expenses to insurers for the purpose of being reimbursed for amounts that exceed the
deductible. See American College of Physicians, supra note 182, at 339.
184. See Scott, supra note 182, at 28.
185. See Cords, supra note 134, at 1245 (arguing that the costs of the record keeping
and reporting requirements placed on account trustees and employees may exceed other
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3. A Questionable Underlying Theory
The basic theory underlying the MSA program is that American health
care consumers will consume as much health care as available, unless fi-
nancial disincentives are created.186 This theory may be true for most
goods and services; however, health care is fundamentally different from
other consumption items. Generally, there is no inherent personal bene-
fit to the consumer who purchases excessively expensive drugs, or who
undergoes unnecessary medical procedures.87 By contrast, if an individ-
ual spends more on food, for example, than average amounts, it can be
assumed that the increased expense results from personal choice. Pre-
sumably, the correlation exists between high medical costs and medical
necessity, rather than between high medical costs and personal choice.""
Furthermore, because individuals typically do not know what medical
treatment they need, consumers shopping for health care face consider-
able and inherent difficulties that do not exist in other markets. 189 Thus,
even if individuals were likely to make health care decisions in the same
manner as they make other spending choices, they would need some
level of medical expertise to make informed decisions. To overcome a
lack of medical education, each individual would need to invest substan-
tial resources in receiving medical training in order to develop the skills
necessary to make informed medical decisions. For many consumers this
solution is inefficient and, accordingly, they will prefer to continue to rely
on their physician's medical advice.
savings caused by MSAs).
186. See Senator Phil Gramm (R-Tex.), Why We Need Medical Savings Accounts, 330
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1752, 1752 (1994) (arguing that if we paid for our groceries through an
insurance-like policy, where the policy covered the bulk of the costs, we would demand
steak for our dogs instead of dog food). A related argument is that of "moral hazard,"
which implies that consumers consume more health services when they are insured or
more fully insured. See THOMAS RICE, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH RECONSIDERED 82
(1998). This "hazard" is due to lack of financial disincentives, as individuals are likely to
consume less services if they pay the full cost of such services. See id. at 83.
187. See Clarke, supra note 153, at 1158 (disputing Senator Gramm's "grocery anal-
ogy").
188. See id.
189. See Medical Savings Accounts Come Out of the Wilderness, supra note 185
(quoting Congressional Research Service policy analyst Bob Lyke: "[H]ealth care provid-
ers are able to influence demand more than other producers and ... there are limits to the
reach of financial incentives affecting patients."); Wicks & Meyer, supra note 142 (con-
tending that the "technical nature of modern medicine" prevents most individuals from
making informed decisions regarding health care). There is little evidence that consumers
possess enough information to make appropriate choices regarding health plans. See
RICE, supra note 186, at 71 (noting that healthcare consumers do not understand such
concepts as "primary care gatekeeping [and] financial incentives to providers").
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VIII. THE MSAs CHANCES OF SUCCESS
A. Design Complexities
Even if the underlying policy of the MSA is sound, the complexity of
the program could have a negative impact on its success. Both buyers
and sellers may be deterred by the uncertain effects of the interim limits
and the lack of permanence of the experimental program. ' 90 The overall
number of accounts in the MSA program is limited to 750,000.91 The
program also provides for interim caps on the number of accounts that
may be established by specific dates within the four-year demonstration• t192
period. The first of several interim caps was effective April 30, 1997,
and was set at 375,000 accounts.' 93 The remaining two interim caps were
114
set at 525,000 by June 30, 1997, and 600,000 by April 15, 1998.
If any of the interim limits had been reached at any time, enrollment
would have ceased and no new accounts would have been allowed.9  In-
dividuals who previously had established their MSAs, however, would
have been permitted to continue making contributions to, and receiving
distributions from, their existing accounts. 96 Thus, the initial uncertainty
surrounding the interim limits may have deterred some insurance com-
panies from gearing up their promotional efforts, out of concern that
they could not be guaranteed continuation of the MSA's tax deductibility
feature beyond the interim dates.197 Furthermore, because many indi-
190. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, MEDICAL SAVINGS
ACCOUNTS: OBSTACLES TO THEIR GROWTH AND WAYS TO IMPROVE THEM (NCPA
Policy Report No. 216, July 1998), available at <http://www.ncpa.org/studies/s216/s216b.
html> [hereinafter NCPA POLICY REPORT No. 216] (noting, in the section on problems
with the MSA, that the 750,000 limit on the number of MSAs has "kept the biggest players
such as Chase Manhattan Bank and Prudential Insurance out of the market").
191. See I.R.C. § 220(j)(2)(A) (Supp. 111996).
192. See id. § 2200); see also FUCHS ET AL., supra note 147, at CRS-24 n.36 (describing
the series of cut-off dates established by the program).
193. See I.R.C. § 220(j)(l)(A).
194. See id. § 220(j)(1)(B), (j)(2)(A); see also Ayers & Plummer, supra note 18, at 262
(stating that if the number of reported MSAs exceeded 375,000 on April 30, 1997, the IRS
would announce a cut off date of September 1, 1997).
195. See I.R.C. § 220(i)(1); see also FUCHS ET AL., supra note 147, at CRS-24 (noting
that once an interim limit had been reached, the MSAs would be limited to those indi-
viduals who already had established accounts). In determining whether a limit had been
reached, the law precludes the IRS from including in the number previously uninsured
individuals. See I.R.C. § 2200)(3).
196. See I.R.C. § 220(i)(1)(A).
197. See NCPA POLICY REPORT NO. 216, supra note 190 (noting that the largest in-
surance companies have not offered MSAs due to the limited market); Linda Koco, Tax-
Qualified MSA Products are on the Rise, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Apr. 21, 1997, at 13
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viduals who sell health insurance have never dealt with financial products
like MSAs, a lack of familiarity with the product may contribute to their
reluctance to aggressively promote the product. An additional factor
that may discourage brokers from marketing MSAs, is that the commis-
sion for high-deductible products is often lower than that for traditional
products.99
Another concern that insurers have expressed about the design of
MSAs pertains to the annual cap placed on the amount that account
holders actually pay for medical expenses, referred to as the "out-of-
pocket maximum."2 O The MSA legislation requires that the catastrophic
insurance plan pay for all covered services in excess of the out-of-pocket
maximum."' Network plans, such as Preferred Provider Organizations
(PPOs), typically give financial incentives to participants who use in-
network providers as a cost control method.2 2 However, under the MSA
program, once the maximum out-of-pocket amount is reached by a par-
ticipant, insurers are required to cover all approved medical services re-
gardless of whether the services are provided in or out of the network.
("The 750,000 limit, combined with the short time line between the law's enactment and
its 1/1/97 implementation and uncertainty over certain MSA reporting requirements, ini-
tially caused many insurers to hold back on market entry."). Because of the uncertainty
associated with the interim limits, as well as the many eligibility restrictions placed on
MSAs, Congress recently attempted to expand the program. See generally, BOB LYKE,
MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: LEGISLATION IN THE 105TH CONGRESS (Cong. Res.
Serv. No. 97-643 EPW, 1998) (discussing potential expansion of MSA availability). The
House proposed and passed the Patient Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 4250, which elimi-
nated limits on the number of taxpayers allowed to participate, deleted the ceilings on the
deductible percentages, and expanded the program to include all employers. See id. at
CRS-3; see also 144 CONG. REC. H6416-17 (daily ed. July 24, 1998) (recording the vote in
which the House passed the Patient Protection Act, 216 for, 210 against). The Senate,
however, tabled the motion to bring the bill to the floor, effectively "killing" the legisla-
tion for the remainder of the 105th Congress. See Amy Goldstein & Helen Dewar, Senate
Kills 'Patients' Rights' Bill: Managed-Care Measure a Victim of Partisanship, Clinton Scan-
dal, Lobbying, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1998, at Al (noting that it failed to pass because, in
part, philosophical differences existed, and "well-funded lobbyists" opposed the legisla-
tion).
198. See GAO MSA REPORT, supra note 67, at 7 (stating that unfamiliarity with the
MSA product as well as the "need to explain the interaction of the qualified plan and the
MSA" negatively affected initial MSA sales).
199. See David Flaum, Medical Savings Accounts' Pros, Cons; Ability to Choose
Among Pluses, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 16, 1998, at 5 (discussing the difference in
commissions between high-deductible insurance policies and traditional health insurance
policies).
200. See I.R.C. § 220(c)(2)(A)(iii) (specifying that, under a high deductible health
plan, an individual's out-of-pocket expenses (other than those paid for premiums) may not
exceed $3000 for self-only coverage and $5500 for family coverage).
201. See id.
202. See GAO MSA REPORT, supra note 67, at 8.
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Because the deductible comprises a large portion of the out-of-pocket
maximum, insurers are concerned that there is insufficient financial pen-S• 201
alty to discourage participants from going outside of the network plan.
The MSA program's design has proven to be problematic not only for
prospective sellers, but also for prospective buyers. Several insurers have
reported that they have had numerous requests for information about
204MSAs, but relatively few sales of the product. Insurance sales persons
have explained that the low sales numbers are due to a lack of under-
standing about the product. For example, some consumers incorrectly
201assume the "use it or lose it" feature of the FSA applies to MSAs. Oth-
ers are confused about the use of MSA funds. One insurer recounted
that a small employer established MSAs for its employees, believing that
instead of paying premiums for the catastrophic plan, the premiums
could be deposited in the employees' MSAs.204
B. A Comparative View of MSAs2 °7
Like the United States, Singapore experienced health care cost infla-
tion in the 1970s. In 1984, Singapore responded to the problem of rising
medical costs by adopting an insurance scheme that resembles the
United States' MSA program.00 Interestingly, Singapore's ten-year ex-
perience with a similar medical program has neither reduced nor con-
trolled health care costs; in fact, its experience shows that after intro-
ducing an MSA-like program, the costs for medical care actually
increased.2 9
203. See id.; see also NCPA POLICY REPORT NO. 216, supra note 192 (noting that
some patients even purposefully will use providers outside the network early on to reach
the out-of-pocket limit, so that they can begin having 100% of their expenses covered by
the insurer).
204. See GAO MSA REPORT, supra note 67, at 7; see also Brian O'Connell, Banks
Prognosis for MSAs: Stable, But Improving, BANK TECH. NEWS, Oct. 1998 (noting that
many banks would not offer MSAs "because of low consumer demand and uncertainty
about the program's rules"). In addition to misunderstanding the MSA program, it is ar-
gued that many consumers just do not know about it, and this lack of awareness has con-
tributed to low sales numbers. See Flaum, supra note 201, at 5.
205. See GAO MSA REPORT, supra note 67, at 7; see also discussion supra Part III.C
(comparing FSAs with MSAs).
206. See GAO MSA REPORT, supra note 67, at 7.
207. A detailed discussion of the Singapore program is beyond the scope of this article.
For more information, see William C. Hsiao, Medical Savings Accounts: Lessons From
Singapore, 14 HEALTH AFF. 260 (1995).
208. See JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, CONTROLLING HEALTH
CARE COSTS WITH MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS App. B (NCPA Policy Report No.
168, Jan. 1992), available at <http://www.ncpa.org/ studies/s168/s1681.html>.
209. See Hsiao, supra note 207, at 260. But see Thomas A. Massaro & Yu-Ning Wong,
1999]
Catholic University Law Review
The Singapore program, known as "Medisave," guarantees each citi-
zen access to quality medical care. The program provides financing for
health services, and at the same time responds to the "moral hazard"
problem of insurance protection by providing incentives to use health
care services responsibly.210 Under the Medisave program, every worker
must deposit part of his or her earnings into an individual Medisave ac-
count; from this account, hospital expenses and certain outpatient serv-
ices can be paid."' The Medisave program also has a lifetime savings fea-
ture which allows individuals to save for retirement."' At death, an
account holder's estate receives any remaining balance."3
The Medisave program in Singapore is currently well established.2 4 To
the extent that the Medisave program compels individuals to save and
pay for health care services with their own money, it is similar to the
MSA concept. Therefore, important lessons can be learned from Singa-
pore's experience. Accordingly, it is very useful to analyze how the
Medisave project has affected both the demand for, and cost of, medical
services in Singapore.25
Positive Experience With Medical Savings Accounts In Singapore, 14 HEALTH AFF. 267,
269 (1995) (stating that the Medisave program has been successful in controlling the infla-
tionary rate of medical costs).
210. See Hsiao, supra note 207, at 261; WILLIAMS & VAN DER REIS, supra note 152, at
124 (noting that the Medisave program's "combination of individual responsibility and
government subsidies helps to keep health care affordable while giving participants an in-
centive to use services appropriately"). "Moral hazard" refers to a problem of insurance
protection which causes those who are insured against certain risks to have incentives to
use less than optimal care to avoid the insured risk. See supra note 186 (explaining the
moral hazard problem). For purposes of defining moral hazard problems it is necessary to
distinguish between two types of risks: reactive and fixed. A reactive risk is one over
which the insured has some control, for example an automobile wreck due to a controlla-
ble cause, such as speeding. See Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and
Moral Hazard, 1991 WIs. L. REV. 65, 68 (1991). A fixed risk is "one over which the in-
sured has no control," such as damage from floods and acts of God. See id.
211. See Hsiao, supra note 207, at 261.
212. See MUKUL G. ASHER, COMPULSORY SAVINGS IN SINGAPORE: AN
ALTERNATIVE TO THE WELFARE STATE (NCPA Policy Report No. 198, Sept. 1995),
available at <http://www.ncpa.org/studies/s198/s198.html> (stating in the section on com-
ponents of the Medisave accounts that a minimum balance of $11,000 must be left in an
individual's account upon reaching age 55 to be used for medical bills during his retire-
ment).
213. See Hsiao, supra note 207, at 261.
214. See id. at 262. "By 1992, 95[%] of the total working population [in Singapore]
above age fifteen had Medisave accounts" and by 1993 "[m]ore than 80[%] of patients
admitted to hospitals used their Medisave accounts to pay their hospital bills .... The re-
maining 20[%] paid their bills out of pocket, or their employers paid them." Id. In 1993,
Singapore established "Medifund," to assist impoverished people with their hospital bills.
See id.
215. When comparing Singapore's Medisave program to our MSA program, however,
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After the Medisave program was introduced, the per capita cost of
health care rose faster than it had in previous years in Singapore. 6 On
average, the rate of increase for health expenditures per capita increased
2% per year, from 11% per capita to 13%.217 Additionally, Singapore
found that after the Medisave program was introduced, health care facili-
ties reallocated the services they provided. Specifically, hospitals began
purchasing more expensive equipment and offering the latest technologi-
cally advanced procedures, although these services ultimately increased
218the inflationary rate for medical services. Hospitals adopted these
practices because they recognized that high-cost services were in greater
demand by physicians. Moreover, because the availability of technologi-
cally advanced procedures was viewed by the public as an indicator of
the quality of care provided by the hospital, hospitals were responding to
consumer demands as well.2 9 Today, ten years after the Medisave pro-
gram was established, Singapore has widespread duplication of costly
medical equipment and advanced technological services; for example, as
many as seven hospitals in Singapore have in vitro fertilization pro-
220grams.
Like the proponents of MSAs in the United States, Singapore initially
believed that the rising cost of medical treatment was in large part attrib-
utable to a lack of sensitivity regarding medical cost on the parts of both
patients and health care providers. However, Singapore has since dis-
covered that the results do not support this theory. After implementing
the Medisave program, Singapore is experiencing a higher rate of infla-
it is important to be aware of several demographic and cultural differences. See
WILLIAMS & VAN DER REIS, supra note 152, at 125. For instance, Singapore has a very
young population. See id. (arguing that "[t]he real test of [Singapore's] health care system
will come as demographic trends begin to match those found elsewhere"); see also Mas-
saro & Wong, supra note 209, at 269 (noting that in 1990, 6.2% of Singapore's population
was above age 65, whereas 12.6% of the United States' population was above that age).
216. See Hsiao, supra note 207, at 264. Singapore did not collect data on their Medis-
ave project that would have provided easy answers to questions about the impact of the
program on health care costs. See id. Nor is there comprehensive data available from
hospitals and clinics that could provide helpful information regarding these questions. See
id. Despite the lack of detailed data, however, there are indicators that can assist in de-
termining whether the Medisave program helped control the escalating costs of medical
care in Singapore.
217. See id. But see Mark V. Pauly & John C. Goodman, Medical Savings Accounts:
The Authors Respond, 14 HEALTH AFF. 277, 278 (1995) (arguing that the Medisave pro-
gram was designed not to keep health expenses from rising, but rather "to ensure that
when Singaporeans enter the medical marketplace, they are able to pay the costs of their
own care without relying on the charity of others or subsidies from the state").
218. See Hsiao, supra note 207, at 264.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 264-65.
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tion in health care than ever before.221 Accordingly, Singapore's govern-
ment has appointed a ministerial committee to investigate the causes of
the problem and propose new solutions.222
It is just as unlikely that MSAs will be successful in curbing rising
health care costs in the United States. The Medisave experiment proved
to be a costly project in Singapore. Although differences in market con-
ditions, program design, and patient preferences make it impossible to
draw direct parallels between the MSA and Singapore's experience with
223its Medisave program, valuable lessons nevertheless can be learned.
Perhaps the most important lesson is caution. Policymakers should pro-
ceed with great caution before instituting an expanded or permanent
MSA program here in the United States.
IX. CURRENT STATUS OF MSA PROGRAM
When the HIPAA was passed, both proponents and opponents be-
lieved that MSAs would be a popular product; however, participation in
224the MSA program has fallen far short of the initial expectations. The
IRS reported that only 9720 MSAs were established by the first interim
cap date of April 30, 1997; MSA legislation had allowed for as many as
375,000 accounts to be established by this date.225 Between January and
June of 1997, only 22,051 MSAs had been opened, a number significantly
below the interim cap of 525,000 accounts set for June 30, 1997.22 6 The
IRS's next official count was on August 1, 1998, and was based on the
number of accounts created through June 30, 1998; the total number of
accounts established was 50,172.27 This figure, too, is significantly below
the applicable interim cap of 600,000.
221. See id. at 265 & ex. 2. In addition, Singapore's restrictions on the use of Medisave
funds encourage individuals to "over-use hospital care and under-use less expensive alter-
natives." GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 208, App. B (noting also that the timing
of medical expenses during an individual's life may not coincide with the accrual of money
in the Medisave account).
222. See Hsiao, supra note 207, at 265.
223. See WILLIAMS & VAN DER REIS, supra note 152, at 125; see also supra note 217
(noting that a comparison of Medisave accounts to MSAs requires one to note the cultural
and demographic differences between Singapore and the United States).
224. See GAO MSA REPORT, supra note 67, at 7 (noting that "sales of qualified plans
have not met the initial expectations of the insurance industry" (emphasis removed)).
225. See LYKE, supra note 197, at CRS-2.
226. See GAO MSA REPORT, supra note 67, at 7. Of this amount, approximately
17% previously were uninsured. See David E. Rosenbaum, There's Been No Rush for
Medical Savings Accounts, But Idea Is Gaining Favor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1997, at All.
227. See MSA Pilot Project Is Still Going, IRS Announces, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept.
30,1998, available in LEXIS, Tax Analyst's Library, Tax Notes Today File.
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The low enrollment for MSAs indicates that the MSA concept has not
yet been fully embraced by American taxpayers. Proponents of the
MSA are hopeful, however, that as individuals become more familiar
with the program, participation will increase.228 Accordingly, they are
encouraged by the fact that MSA sales increased more than 100% from
the first cut-off date to the second.
Whether the low enrollment is attributable to the complexity of the
program's design, a lack of interest, or a temporary lag in interest cannot
be determined at this point. However, low enrollment in the MSA pro-
gram already has delayed the availability of information about the MSA
pilot. 2 9 Because less than half of the total number of accounts allowed
have been established, the GAO advised Congress to postpone the
demographics survey.23° The GAO believed that the extremely low en-
rollment numbers would make it infeasible to conduct the required sur-
vey.23' Demographics surveys such as the one required by MSA legisla-
tion use random-digit dialing to examine the characteristics of people
with and without MSAs. GAO representatives explained that, because
of the low number of MSA account holders, it would require unreason-
able amounts of labor and funds to randomly reach an equivalent num-
ber of MSA account holders as non-MSA enrollees. 2  Therefore, it will
be some time before economists can begin to fully assess the impact of
the MSA pilot project, and determine if an expanded and permanent
MSA program is warranted.
CONCLUSION
As designed, the MSA program presents serious perception, equity,
and social policy concerns. The program was marketed as a health care
program, but in reality its purpose is two-fold-medical and retirement
savings. As a savings program, the MSA disproportionately benefits in-
dividuals who can afford to save. As a health care program, the MSA
disproportionately benefits individuals who are healthy and informed.
Thus, rather than delivering a single health care benefit to a cross-section
of the population, the MSA delivers two separate and distinct benefits to
228. See supra note 197 (discussing Congress's attempts to expand the MSA program,
and citing as one of the reasons for its attempts the uncertainty surrounding the perma-
nence of the pilot program).
229. See Gwen Moulton, GAO Shelves Demographics Survey Until 325,000 Establish
Accounts, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Oct. 20,1997, at G-2 to G-3.
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relatively few individuals.
Notwithstanding its limited number of beneficiaries and dual savings
focus, the cost of the MSA program nevertheless could be justified if
MSA were able to curb the rising cost of health care. The focus and de-
sign of the MSA program, however, raise serious doubts that this goal
can be accomplished.
If one is not persuaded to withhold support for an expanded MSA
program because of these arguments, it is at least important to recognize
that the anticipated benefits of the MSA program cannot occur without
substantial costs, complexity, and repercussions to existing markets and
social programs. Therefore, while it still is too early to determine
whether the MSA program will prove to be an innovative way to reduce
health care costs and provide the social good of more and better health
care for greater numbers of Americans, it is not too early to recognize
that the MSA program provides large windfalls for individuals in Ameri-
can society who are the most fortunate: those who are the healthiest,
wealthiest, and most informed.
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